DOING TIME FOR CLINICAL CRIME: THE PROSECUTION

OF INCOMPETENT PHYSICIANS AS AN ADDITIONAL
MECHANISM TO ASSURE QUALITY HEALTH CARE
In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my
patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing .... If I
keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my art,
respected by all men and in all times; but if I swerve from it or
violate it, may the reverse be my lot.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, there has been an increase in the
number of prosecutions of health care professionals' charged with
the death of patients. While these cases may not signal a long-term
trend," recent developments raise concern for the medical community.4 At the forefront of this concern is the point at which an error
I Daniel M. Ginter, Nursing The Problem: Responding to Patient Abuse in New York
State, 28 CoLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 559, 559 (1995) (quoting the Hippocratic Oath,
which all physicians must take prior to being admitted to the profession of medicine).
In the context of this Note, the term "health care professional" refers to physicians unless otherwise noted. Physician means, for the purpose of this article, "a
doctor of medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine or surgery
by a State." 45 C.F.R. § 60.8 (1996). There are, however, cases in which other
health care professionals, such as nurses and dentists, have also been prosecuted for
the death of patient. See, e.g., People v. Spence, 648 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637-38 (App. Div.
1996) (upholding the conviction of a nurse for willfully violating public health laws
when the nurse failed to administer medication to patients in a nursing home); Police Seek Charges in FatalMistake, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 1994, at C6, availablein
1994 WL 4937668 [hereinafter Police Seek] (discussing the possibility of prosecuting
a nurse for manslaughter following the nurse's accidental killing of a patient by
administering a mistaken injection); Debbie Salamone, Dentist Sony for Death, Fights
to Keep License,

ORI.ANDO SENNEL,

Dec. 5, 1991, at B3, availablein 1991 WL 9079120

(reporting the conviction of a dentist for manslaughter when an eight-year-old girl
died after the dentist administered the wrong dosage of medication to the youth).
3 See Francis P. Bensel & Barbara DeCrow Goldberg,
Prosecutionand Punitives For
Malpractice Rise, Slowly, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at B7, B10 (concluding that the
prosecution of health care providers is an exception to the rule rather than a
trend).
4 See Alexander McCall Smith, Criminalor Merely Human ?: The Prosecution
of Negligent Doctors, 12J. ComrEMP. HFALTH L. & POL'Y 131, 131 (1995) (noting that the
marked increase in the number of prosecutions against physicians for the death of
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in professional judgment warrants criminal liability, as opposed, or
in addition, to more traditional civil sanctions.6
The medical profession is unique in that, unlike other professions, physicians essentially have an affirmative duty to take risks
Physicians are required to make crucial judgments and perform their
duties with a high degree of skill." At the same time, physicians are
human and inevitably make mistakes.9 While a mistake by a physipatients has led to heightened concern among the medical community); see also
Doctors Concerned By Ciminal Charges, ST. PETERsBuRG TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at 4B,
available in 1991 WL 9132166 (noting that doctors in Florida are increasingly
alarmed by the trend to charge doctors criminally for medical mistakes); Diane M.
Gianelli, MD Charged With Manslaughter After Nursing Home Patient Dies, AM. MED.
NEws, Apr. 22-29, 1991, at 1, 2 (explaining that a state medical association raised
money for a doctor's defense because it feared that the case could have severe repercussions); Thomas Maier, More Doctors Face Prosecution; Crimes Charged in Cases of
Deadly Error, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 1995, at A35, available in 1995 WL 5107204
(reporting on the increased number of letters from concerned doctors to medical
groups, including the American Medical Association (AMA), concerning the prosecution of physicians); Malpracticeor Homicide?, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1995, at A16,
available in 1995 WL 2089365 (explaining that the medical community is concerned
with the new approach toward prosecuting health care professionals for medical errors that result in death).
5 The term error refers to a "'performance which deviates from the ideal.'"
Smith, supra note 4, at 135 (citation omitted). All errors, however, are not created
equally. See id. at 136. There exists a distinction between a mere slip, which is a
common occurrence in everyday life that is often due to a "malfunction of routine
methods of dealing with familiar stimuli, and 'mistakes,' which involve faulty decision-making." Id.; see alsoJoHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 193-95 (2d ed. 1991) (citingJames Reason, The Psychopathology ofEveryday
Slips, THE ScIENcES 45, 49 (Sept/Oct_ 1984) (opining that the only difference between mental errors that lead to horrific accidents and the slips of everyday life is
environmental, as opposed to psychological)). Medical errors often are the result
of inadequate technical or interpersonal care, incompetence, or inattentiveness. See
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and ProperRole of Regulation to Assure the Quality
ofHealth Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525, 531 (1988).
6 SeeJost, supra note 5, at 525. Traditional civil sanctions include medical malpractice suits and disciplinary actions by peer review groups and state licensing
boards. See id.
1 See Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 689 (1991) (describing the medical
profession as a "high-risk occupation"). The Hippocratic Oath states that the duty of
a physician is "'[to] follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability
and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever
is deleterious and mischievous.'" JAY KATZ, THE SILErr WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT 4 (1984) (citation omitted). To the extent that medicine is not a perfect
science, physicians are required to take risks everyday, provided the patient is informed of the risks and benefits of the proposed medical procedure, and the patient consents. See id. 48-84 (discussing the development of informed consent).
See Smith, supra note 4, at 135.
SeeJost, supra note 5, at 531 (noting that the provision of medical care is extremely complex and the best health care professionals sometimes commit errors
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cian may be grounds for malpractice or disciplinary action, it does
not necessarily follow that the physician committed a crime. 0 In
some instances, however, it may be appropriate, perhaps even desirable, to impose criminal sanctions against a physician as a mechanism to regulate incompetent" physicians and to assure quality
health care 12 for consumers.
with devastating results); Catherine S. Meschievitz, Efficacious or Precarious?Comments
on the Processing and Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims in the United States, 3
ANNALS H.ALTH L. 123, 126 (1994) (acknowledging that an inherent part of the delivery of medical care is medical error); see alsoJohnV. Jacobi, Patientsat a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 705, 767 (1997) (explaining that, "[u]nfortunately, medicine is as much art as
science"). Several studies have documented the rate of medical errors in health
care institutions. For example, one study concentrating on hospitalization in New
York State revealed that there was a four percent risk to patients of suffering an
"adverse event," defined in the study as an event that lengthened a hospital stay by
one or more days or resulted in death. See Meschievitz, supra, at 127 (citing
HARVARD MEDIcAL PRAcncE STUDY GROUP, PATIENTS, DocroRs AND LAwYERs: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTCE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990)).

Additionally, an "observation study" of a hospital in Chicago revealed that (1) 44%
of the hospital's patients experienced one error while hospitalized, (2) almost 20%
experienced multiple errors, and (3) 14% of the cases resulted in a serious injury,
defined as death or permanent disability. See id. at 127-28 (citing Lori B. Andrews,
Medical Error and Patient Claiming in a Hospital Setting, Paper prepared for the
Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, in Chicago, Ill. (May 30, 1993) (on file
with the ANNALS OF HEALTH LAw)); see also Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook,
PreventableDeaths: Who, How Often, and Why.?, inANNALS INTERNAL MED. 582, 586, 588
(1988) (finding that 14% to 27% of the deaths that occurred in the hospitals studied may have been preventable; however, the study was limited to patients with
pneumonia, myocardial infarction, or cerebrovascular accident).
10 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 113 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining that, although negligent conduct constitutes a breach of duty of care,
every breach is not necessarily a crime); see also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 866
(Miss. 1985) (explaining that "[a] competent physician is not liable per se for a mere
error ofjudgment, mistaken diagnosis, or the occurrence of an undesirable result").
For example, a state prosecutor did not file manslaughter charges against a hospital, surgeon, or nurse anesthesiologist in the death of a four-year-old patient who
died from cardiac arrest during an operation to suture wounds from a dog bite. See
Pa. ProsecutorFinds No Grounds for Charges Against Surgeon, AM. MED. NEws, June 1,
1990, at 5, availablein 1990 WL 3259745. An autopsy revealed that the child's heart
muscle had an inflammation that, if present before the accident, could have resulted in the cardiac arrhythmia during anesthesia. See id. The prosecutor explained that a mere deviation from the accepted standard of medical care does not
constitute criminal negligence. See id.
n The term "incompetent," as used in this Note, refers only
to the provision of
medical care that falls below the acceptable standard of care determined by the
medical profession. It does not encompass unprofessional conduct such as the
abuse of drugs or alcohol, sexual misconduct, insurance fraud, or the illegal prescription of controlled substances. Nor does this Note address situations in which a
patient's death is caused by an individual practicing medicine who does not possess
an appropriate medical license.
The Institute of Medicine defines quality of health care "as the degree to
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The pursuit of quality health care by the medical profession and
health care institutions is not a new phenomenon. 14 Recently, however, with the systematic shift away from fee-for-service care to managed care, 3 the concern among consumers 6 and the federal govwhich health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge."
INSTrTUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING HEALTH CARE REFORM 34 (Marilyn J. Field et al.
eds., 1993); see alsoAvEDis DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINrIION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES
TO ITS ASSESSMENT 4-6 (1980) (noting the complexity in arriving at a single definition for the term quality, but ultimately defining quality health care to mean "that
kind of care which is expected to maximize an inclusive measure of patient welfare,
after one has taken account of the balance of expected gains and losses that attend
the process of care in all its parts.");Jost, supra note 5, at 530 (stating that "[a] physician of high quality is one who consistently delivers technical care that maximizes
benefits over risks and who relates appropriately to his patients").
Is Assuring quality health care, or quality assurance, means, for purposes of this
Note, the process used "to monitor the quality of care provided to patients and ordinarily includes measures of available resources and the process of care, as well as
patient outcomes." Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform:
Promiseand Limitations, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 37,38 (1994).
14 SeeJost, supra note 5, at 525 (emphasizing that the law has been
concerned
with the quality of heath care since ancient times). For example, the Code of
Hammurabi, a set of laws prepared by Babylonian Kings dating back to 1792 B.C.,
mandated that a doctor's hand be cut off when the doctor's negligence resulted in
the death of a patient or ruined a patient's sight. See id.; BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
715 (6th ed. 1990). State licensing boards, which monitor physicians' competence,
see infra Part ll.C., have existed in the United States since the 1600s. See Timothy
StoltzftsJost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the
Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 825, 827 (1995). In the 1970s, consumer groups began to
demand that the issue of competence be addressed, and the notion of peer review,
initiated by the federal government but later adopted by health care institutions
and state licensing boards, emerged as a mechanism for quality assurance. See id. at
832-33.
is Managed care refers to a system of health insurance that controls both the
payment and delivery of health care services. See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform Proposals, and Trade-offs, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1319,
1321 n.1 (1996). Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) regulate the cost, volume,
and type of health care services through contracting with health care providers and
controlling the provision of health care through organization controls and financial
incentives. See id. Traditionally, under fee-for-service or insurance indemnity plans,
the insured would contract with the insurance company, choose a physician, pay the
physician when services were rendered, and be reimbursed by the insurance company. See id. Managed care dramatically altered this relationship because under a
managed care system, the insurer provides the medical services directly, or contracts
with health care providers, such that the insured no longer has total control over
choosing a physician. See id.
Many different forms of managed care exist-the most familiar are health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs).
See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed CareIncentive Payments to Physicians, 22
AM.J.L. & MED. 399, 401 (1996). HMOs provide extensive medical services to subscribers through a predetermined panel of physicians. See Rodwin, supra, at 1321
n.1. Subscribers pay a portion of their medical services in the form of set monthly
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ernment to monitor and assure quality health care has reached a
new level of urgency. 7 The alarm over quality of care is not unfounded as indicated by a growing body of evidence suggesting that
incompetent physicians pose a serious threat to consumers' health. 8
premiums and nominal fees, such as copayments. See id. From this pool of resources, the HMO pays for the insured's services; therefore, the HMO has a vested
interest in the provision of cost effective health care. See id. In a PPO, however, an
insurer contracts with a limited number of physicians who provide medical care at
discounted fee-for-service rates. See Latham, supra, at 401. An insured may choose
to use a physician that is not a preferred provider; however, the insured usually
must pay stiff penalties, such as high deductibles or copayments. See id.
Essentially, managed care systems, regardless of the form, have the same underlying goal: "[C]ontrolling a provider's behavior through financial incentives."
Rodwin, supra, at 1321 n.1. The key element of any managed care plan is the
mechanism used by the organization to control costs. See Latham, supra,at 401. For
example, some mechanisms to control costs are
initial screening of patients by a gatekeeper nurse or physicians whose
approval is required prior to ordering expensive services and referrals
to specialists; second opinion requirements prior to referrals for specialty care or hospitalization; organized contemporaneous case review
or retrospective utilization review (UR) to spot inappropriate care;
programs to educate providers as to medical costs; a concentration on
provision to enrollees of preventive care (such as inoculation) designed to limit their need for costly services in the future; use of medical care protocols to standardize and control treatment; and use of financial incentives (copayments and deductibles) to reduce insureds'
utilization of services.
Id. (citation omitted).
16 Consumers, in this Note, refers not only to patients
but also to those individuals who are well and not under the supervision of a physician. See Rodwin, supra
note 15, at 1323 n.7 (cautioning that because the physician and patient share a fiduciary relationship, it "is more complex than an ordinary consumer-producer relationship"). But seeJacobi, supra note 9, at 708-30 (positing that the fiduciary role of
the physician in the patient-doctor relationship has eroded due to the advent of
managed care).
1 Critics of the medical profession's self-policing system attribute the trend in
prosecuting physicians for incompetent care to the system's failure to discipline
physicians adequately. See Maier, supranote 4, at A35. For example, the Director of
the Washington Public Citizens' Health Research Group stated: "Everyone is becoming aware that the doctor-run disciplinary system isn't working as well as it
should, and something else should be done." Id.; see also Bensel & Goldberg, supra
note 3, at B7 (noting that some commentators suggest that the rise in prosecution
of health care providers is attributable to the lack of adequate supervision by state
licensing boards) ;Jost, supra note 5, at 526 & n.5 (observing a "rash of federal legislation" aimed at assuring quality medical care, such as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (1994) (HCQIA)); Linda
Oberman, Defining Clinical Crirm; New Cases Raise Questions On What Goes to Court,
AM. MmD. NEws, Sept. 6, 1993, at 2, availablein 1993 WL 12219071 (noting the dismay of the director of New York City's Center for Medical Consumers at the inadequacy of current quality assurance mechanisms such as state licensing programs);
infranotes 100-35 and accompanying text (discussing HCQIA).
18 See Adler, supra note 7, at 690 & n.26 (citing research findings that anywhere
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One justification for the prosecution of physicians for negligent
conduct is that physicians will exercise greater care if they know that
their negligence might lead to criminal charges. 9 If, however,
mechanisms of private regulation such as medical malpractice suits
and disciplinary actions are not adequately monitoring physicians'
competence, resorting to the criminal law to punish physicians, as
opposed to addressing the inadequacies of private regulation, may
be unjust." This is particularly true when the physician did not act
with a "careless or cavalier attitude" towards the patient.2' Furthermore, many health care professionals argue that prosecuting physicians for negligent medical errors will exacerbate the practice of defensive medicine' and thereby increase the cost of health care."
Apart from what the medical profession believes is the most appropriate way to handle incompetent physicians, there remains concern over what mechanism best protects consumers. As the relationship between patient and physician, a situation once marked by trust
and confidence, becomes more tenuous, patients will lose confidence in the medical profession's system of self-policing for quality
assurance. 4 Moreover, because the average consumer lacks the reqfrom 4% to 30% of doctors are incompetent);Jost, supranote 5, at 538 n.77 (citing
a study that estimates 4% to 30% of physicians are incompetent); Buddy Rake &
Bobby Thrasher, MedicalMalpracticeMyths, Truths and Solutions, 32 ARiz. ATr'v 20, 24
(1996) (noting that "findings increasingly suggest that much iatrogenic injury is
being committed by incompetent physicians"); Robert Steinbrook & Virginia Ellis,
Medical Board Lagging in DisciplinaryAction Doctors: A Judge's Rebuke of State Agency's
Role in Klvana Case Underscores Criticism From Other Sectors, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1990,
at 1, available in 1990 WL 2396104 (reporting that Harvard University researchers
assessed that poor medical care caused permanent medical disability in 2500 cases
in New York during 1984 and played some role in the deaths of over 13,000 patients); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing statistical evidence
on the rate of medical errors).
19
See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (discussing the utilitarian notion of punishment).
20 See Smith, supra note 4, at 137 (opining that "the only state
of mind which is
deserving of punishment is that which demonstrates an intention to cause harm to
others, or where there is a deliberate willingness to subject others to the risk of
harm").
21

See id. at 135.

n Defensive medicine refers to the practice of ordering unnecessary and excessive diagnostic tests to guard against potential lawsuits. See DAvID M. HARNEY,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 417 (2d ed. 1987); see alsoJost, supra note 5, at 574 (defining
defensive medicine as treatment provided only to avoid malpractice liability where
the expense is disproportionate to the possible injury it seeks to avoid).
23 See infra note 245 (noting the economic effect of the practice
of defensive
medicine on the health care industry).
24 SeeJacobi, supra note 9, at 706-07 (arguing that managed care's
structural
changes in health care financing have weakened the physician-patient relationship
to the extent that patients can no longer rely on their physician's loyalty as the pri-
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uisite expertise and time to make educated judgments concerning
the quality of medical services, 5 purchasers will look to other
mechanisms, including criminal sanctions, to hold incompetent physicians more accountable for their actions.
This Note addresses the perceived inadequacies of the private
regulation of physician competence and examines whether criminal
sanctions offer an effective solution. Part II of this Note discusses
the traditional approaches used to address incidents of medical error, including medical malpractice civil suits, state medical board licensing, and professional disciplinary actions by peer review committees. Next, Part III outlines the role of criminal law as an additional
method of assuring quality health care by analyzing the degree of
negligence required to prosecute a health care professional for a fatal clinical error and by examining several highly publicized cases. 26
In Part IV, this Note focuses on general theoretical arguments for
and against criminal punishment for fatal clinical errors. In addition, Part IV addresses the practical effects of criminal sanctions on
the medical profession and patient care. Part V concludes by arguing that if civil and criminal mechanisms of quality assurance operate
in tandem, rather than simply coexisting, the gaps that currently exist in the quality assurance system may adequately be filled.
II. TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING PHYSICIAN
COMPETENCE

A.

Introduction

Despite the troubling evidence concerning the number of incompetent physicians in the United States, 27 the traditional mechanisms for monitoring physician incompetence and ensuring the
quality of health care have proven largely inadequate.28 Medical
malpractice litigation focuses on individual medical errors that result
marg mechanism of quality assurance).
See Jost, supra note 5, at 560-64 (noting that because most consumers lack
technical knowledge and medical expertise, health care is essentially a "'credence
good,' meaning that the consumer must ultimately trust that [the care] was helpful,
but can never know for sure") (citation omitted).
26 This part also details several situations in which physicians
have been criminally charged for medical errors that resulted in a patient's death. The term "case,"
in this section, is also used to denote reported trials and appeals as well as press reports covering criminal charges for which there is no reported decision.
27 See supra note 18 (noting recent studies documenting
statistical evidence on
the percentage of incompetent physicians practicing in this country).
See infra notes 53-63, 70-89, 95-99, 123-38 and accompanying text (discussing
the inadequacy of the current mechanisms of quality assurance).
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in injury, relies on a judge or jury to evaluate the alleged medical errors, and imposes monetary sanctions if the physician is found liable." In addition, state medical licensing boards monitor the quality of health care by inspecting physician practices to ensure that the
quality of care delivered meets the state's standards and impose sanctions, such as suspending or revoking physicians' licenses, when the
care fails to meet that requisite standard." Also, professional disciplinary systems rely on peer review organizations to monitor the
quality of physicians' conduct at a specific institution." By imposing
coercive sanctions, including the denial, revocation, or suspension of
staff or clinical privileges, peer review organizations influence physicians' behavior. 2 Unfortunately, however, controlling the quality of
health care by monitoring physician competency leaves much to be
desired.-'
B. Medical Malpractice
The two principal objectives of medical malpractice are to reim-4
burse injured patients and to monitor the quality of health care.3
Malpractice litigation is a legal approach, through the tort system,
that seeks to deter health care professionals from practicing negli5 In general, tort law imposes
gently and committing medical errors.3
obligations on individuals to conduct themselves in a manner that
will not result in injury to others.3 Unlike criminal law, which allows
the state to penalize the wrongdoer to protect the common interests
of society, tort law affords an injured party an opportunity to seek

See Adler, supra note 7, at 694-95;Jost, supranote 5, at 533.
soseeJost, supra note 5, at 583, 535.
S1 See id. at 553-54.
52
See id. at 554-55. Physicians are typically not employees at the hospitals in
which they practice, but rather are granted privileges to admit patients and use the
hospitals' facilities as independent contractors. See id. at 553-54. The particular
hospital's governing board, based on the recommendation of the incumbent medical staff, decides whether staff and clinical privileges should be granted. See id. at
554. Having been admitted to the medical staff, the physician can admit patients.
See id. The type of procedures the physicians are permitted to perform in the hospital, however, is determined by the extent of their clinical privileges. See id. It is
common for physicians to have staff privileges at more than one hospital. See id.
See infra notes 53-63, 70-89, 95-99, 123-38 and accompanying text (discussing
the inadequacy of the current mechanisms).
S4 See Adler, supra note 7, at 694-95; Jost, supra note 5, at 572 (explaining
that
medical malpractice is "[tihe primary legal, as opposed to social or economic,
means of quality assurance").
See Adler, supra note 7, at 694;Jost, supra note 5, at 572.
See WILLLAm L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAS ON TORTS 1 (8th ed. 1988).
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individual compensation from the wrongdoer for losses suffered."7
The potential for liability deters the repetition of harmful conduct."
In a negligence case, comparing the wrongdoer's conduct with
the conduct expected of a reasonable and prudent person in the
same or similar circumstances determines liability."" Liability attaches only when the wrongdoer fails to exercise this reasonable
standard of carei4 Consequently, in the context of medical malpractice, a physician will be held liable when the physician's conduct falls
below the standard level of care.4 ' The standard of care to which a
physician is held differs, however, because the reasonableness of the
physician's conduct is not compared to that of a reasonable person;
rather, it is compared to the special skill, training, and knowledge of
physicians under the same or similar conditions.42 Therefore, medist See DAN B. Doas ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 1, at 5-6
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing the function of tort law).
See id. § 4, at 25-26 (explaining that although the deterrent effect of tort law is
not controlling, it often influences the decision to impose liability on'the wrongdoer).
s9 See Alan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv.
549, 558 (1959); see also DoBBS ET AL., supra note 37, § 32, at 173 (noting that the
entire theory of negligence presumes "some uniform standard of behavior").
40 See RESrATEMENr (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 298 (1965) (explaining that
conduct is
negligent only if performed without the care that a reasonable person in the same
position, with the same competence and information, would exercise).
41 See HARNEY, supra note 22,
at 411.
42 See DAVID W. LouIsELL & HAROLD WILLIAMs, MEDICAL MALL'RACTICE 8.04, at
830 to 8-33 (1997); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 37, § 32, at 185-87 (noting that
professionals, in addition to exercising reasonable care, must also possess the
minimum standard of ability and special knowledge required by the particular profession). Most courts define the duty of care as the minimum amount of skill and
knowledge possessed by a competent physician. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d
856, 873 (Miss. 1985). Some courts, however, interpret the duty of care to mean
the care exercised by an average physician. See, e.g., Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455,
457 (Ariz. 1938). But see Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n., 349 A.2d
245, 252-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (disapproving of the application of the average physician standard and emphasizing that the standard should be based on the
skill and care of a reasonably competent physician); HARNEY, supra note 22, at 416
(opining that the appropriate standard of care should not refer to the average
medical conduct but rather should refer to "good medical practice"). Comment (e)
to section 299A of the Restatement Second of Torts explains the appropriate standard of care:
In the absence of any such special representation, the standard of skill
and knowledge required of the actor who practices a profession or
trade is that which is commonly possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing. It is not that of the most highly
skilled, nor is it that of the average member of the profession or trade,
since those who have less than median or average skill may still be
competent and qualified. Half of the physicians of America do not
automatically become negligent in practicing medicine at all, merely

578

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:569

cal malpractice litigation serves as a mechanism to assure that quality
medical care is provided to patients by subjecting health care professionals whose conduct falls below acceptable standards of care to retrospective review.43 In theory, if health care professionals are forced
to pay for the cost of their medical errors, they will undertake preventive measures to assure that medical errors do not occur." Furthermore, medical malpractice litigation also has the potential to
punish physicians for recklessly or wantonly providing negligent
medical care through the award of punitive damages. 4
Liability for malpractice does not automatically attach when a
physician renders medical treatment that produces a bad result."
because their skill is less than the professional average.
§ 299A cmt. e.
3 SeeJost, supra note
5, at 572.
" See id.
45 See Graham v. Columbia-Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 588 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3
(App. Div.
1992) (holding that if the conduct of the defendant was "'intentional, malicious,
outrageous, or otherwise aggravated beyond mere negligence,'" punitive damages
could be awarded) (citations omitted); Spinosa v. Weinstein, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747, 754
(App. Div. 1991) (concluding that only where the tortfeasor's alleged actions
amount to "'gross recklessness or intentional, wanton or malicious conduct'" are
punitive damages available) (citations omitted); see also Cerisse Anderson, Punitive
Awardfor Doctor's Reckless Treatment, N.Y.LJ., Nov. 4, 1991, at I (noting that punitive
damages against a physician were upheld by a trial court judge because the physician's "'actions in his course of treatment were committed in such a manner to be
wanton and reckless and without regard to the rights and safety of his patient'")
(citation omitted). Further, punitive damages include
damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and
above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the
wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of
the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil
behavior or to make an example of him ....
BLAcx's LAw DicrIoNAi" 390 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of the nature and effectiveness of punitive damages, see generally David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and
the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103 (1982).
6 SeeLouIsELL & WLIAMs, supra note 42,
4.02, at 4-2 (noting that "[a] physician is not an insurer of the results of his diagnosis and treatment"); see also Boyce,
77 P.2d at 457 (emphasizing that a presumption of negligence does not arise
merely because the treatment rendered "was unsuccessful, failed to bring the best
results, or [caused] the patient['s death]"); SYLVIA LAW & STEVE_ POLAN, PAIN AND
PROFrr 30 (1978) (observing that the term medical error is broader than the term
medical malpractice because medical malpractice encompasses only those injurious
medical errors that a reasonable physician would not commit); Jose Lozano, Malpracticeand the Health Care Crisis, AM. MED. NEws, Aug. 24, 1992, at 40, available in
1992 WL 11292224 (stressing that medical negligence should not be automatically
equated with an adverse or bad outcome because unpleasant and undesirable results, including death, are often simply the side effects of many medications or proRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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Nor will a physician be held liable for an error in judgment if there
exists a difference of opinion concerning the patient's medical condition or the proper treatment regimen, so long as the physician exercised reasonable care and skill.
The elements a plaintiff must
prove to succeed in a medical malpractice case are similar to a typical
negligence action." Medical malpractice cases differ significantly
from the typical negligence case, however, in that the plaintiff in the
medical malpractice case is required to establish affirmatively the
applicable standard of care through expert testimony. 9 Essentially,
this means that the medical profession itself establishes the applicable standard of care.w° The traditional "locality rule," which was used
cedures).

.7 See

BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERLAtS AND PROBLEMS
177
(2d ed. 1991) (noting that the "honest error in judgment doctrine" permits a physician to choose among several different methods of treatment that are accepted by
the medical profession); LouisELL & WILliAMs, supra note 42, 1 9.05, at 9-34 to 9-35
(discussing the "honest error of judgment" defense that protects physicians from
liability for an error in medical judgment where there exists multiple, reasonable
courses of action); see also Roach v. Hockey, 634 P.2d 249, 252 (Or. CL App. 1981)
(upholding the general rule that a physician is not liable for an honest error in
judgment).
See Dale L. Moore, DisparateTreatment of the Allocation of Power Between Judge and
Jury in Legal and Medical MalpracticeCases, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 353, 355 (1988). Plaintiff must establish that the physician departed from the appropriate standard of care
by proving "(1) the existence of a duty running from the physician to the injured
party; (2) the physician's breach of this duty; (3) an injury to the patient that is
proximately caused by the doctor's breach of duty; and (4) damages arising from
the injury." LoulsEL.L & WAMs, supra note 42, 8.01, at 8-4 to 8-5.
9 See Boyce, 77 P.2d at 457 (noting, however, that expert testimony
is not required where the physician's "negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would
have no difficulty recognizing it"). To qualify as an expert witness in a medical
malpractice case, the individual must establish, by her knowledge, training, skill,
and education, that she can assist the trier of fact. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d
856, 873-74 (Miss. 1985). In mostjurisdictions an expert witness is not required to
be board certified in the area of practice for which she is testifying. Cf Hanson v.
Baker, 534 A.2d 665, 667 (Me. 1987) (upholding exclusion of medical expert testimony in a medical malpractice suit involving a head injury where the lower court
excluded the testimony because the expert lacked experience and education in
neurology, and not because the expert was not board certified). In fact, in some
jurisdictions that take a liberal view, the witness is not even required to hold a
medical degree so long as she possesses sufficient medical knowledge.
See
Thompson v. Carter, 518 So. 2d 609, 614 (Miss. 1987) (allowing a toxicologist to
testify as to a drug's side effects). On the other hand, some jurisdictions adopt a
narrow view requiring the expert to be trained in the relevant field and to have
practiced in the same locale as the defendant. See Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370
N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a licensed psychologist was not competent to provide expert testimony concerning the required standard of care of a
medical physician).
so See Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System, 262 JAMA 3320,
3323 (1989). The conduct, or lack thereof, at issue in a medical malpractice case
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to determine the standard of care, required a medical expert to
compare the conduct of the defendant with that of reputable physicians in the same locality or similar community.5' As a result of modem transportation, communication, and technology, courts abandoned the locality rule, recognizing that today the practice of
medicine is national in scope. -52
concerns matters of scientific knowledge and expertise that are not generally within
the realm of the typicaljuror. See Louisu.L & WILIIAMs, supra note 42, 8.01, at 8-5.
Therefore, in stark contrast to the typical negligence case, the custom of the medical profession almost exclusively determines the appropriate standard of care. See
McCoid, supranote 39, at 606; Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical
MalpracticeRisks Between Patientsand Providers, 49 LAW & CoNFMP. PBos. 173, 173
(1986). One explanation for relying on the custom of the medical profession is
that a standard established by other competent physicians enables the physician to
make medical judgments based on her training, knowledge, and skill without the
apprehension that "some outsider" will judge the medical decision in hindsight. See
id. at 608.
51 See HARNEY, supra note 22, at 412. This traditional standard of
care is referred
to as the locality rule and was established to protect rural and small town practitioners, who were often thought to be less adequately equipped and informed than
practitioners from larger, urban areas. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n., 349 A.2d 245, 248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). The locality rule, however,
has been modified and largely replaced by the national standard. SeeFuRow ETAL.,
supra note 47, at 134; see also infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the
adoption of the national standard).
See LouisELL & WILuAMs, supra note 42, 8.04, at 8-34. For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted, in support of its decision to adopt the national standard, that the admissions standards at medical schools are similar; resident programs have substantially similar requirements; physicians have immediate access to
current medical information through computer services, journals, and seminars;
and physicians are more mobile today, attending medical school in one state, completing a residency in another, and establishing a practice in yet another state. See
HalL 466 So. 2d at 870; see also Shilkret, 349 A.2d at 249 (recognizing that new medical discoveries and techniques are now readily available to physicians in all areas of
the country and further noting that the quality of medical schools has been standardized).
The Hall court recognized, however, that the main aspect of the locality rule,
which takes into consideration the availability of medical equipment, facilities, and
services, remains valid because the availability of medical resources differs around
the country. See 466 So. 2d at 872 (noting, for example, that a hospital in a rural
area may not have the equipment necessary to perform a CAT scan). Therefore,
the duty of a physician to exercise the appropriate standard of care is "based upon
the adept use of such medical facilities, services, equipment and options as are reasonably available." Id. (observing that in situations where the needed medical facilities are unavailable locally, but are "reasonably accessible" elsewhere, the physician
is held to "minimally acceptable standards" of care that take into consideration factors such as the risk to the patient's health in effectuating a transfer, the trouble
and expense of a transfer, and the superior facilities at the transferee institution).
Specifically, the Hall court defined the national standard of care:
[G]iven the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty
to use his or her knowledge and therewith treat through maximum
reasonable medical recovery, each patient, with such reasonable dili-

1997]

PROSECUTION OFINCOMPETENTPHYSICANS

581

Just how effective medical malpractice is at compensating injured victims and monitoring quality control, however, is difficult to
ascertain." As to the first function, the disproportionately low number of injured people who actually file claims against health care professionals demonstrates that malpractice litigation falls short of
compensating injured victims.5 ' In addition, even when a claimant
wins at trial, the award often does not fully compensate the injured
party for the economic losses incurred through the litigation process."" Furthermore, although a general perception exists that juries
are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs because of exorbitant cash judgments, the reality is that in an overwhelming majority of malpractice
cases, the defendant-physician prevails.m
gence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by minimally
competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice
throughout the United States, who have available to them the same
general facilities, services, equipment, and options.
Id. at 873.
See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 50, at 8320-21 (explaining that because malpractice data is not systematically collected, it is difficult to understand the precise relationship between tort awards and quality of care).
See Meschievitz, supra note 9, at 126-28 (noting that of the 100,000 patients
who suffered adverse events in New York state hospitals, the number of legal claims
raised was only 125, and further noting that of the 14% of patients in Chicago hospitals who suffered serious injuries, defined as adverse events resulting in permanent disability or death, only 3% brought legal claims); see also Adler, supra note 7,
at 688-89 (noting that during the mid-1980s, at the height of the medical malpractice crisis (see infra note 60 for a more detailed discussion of the medical malpractice crisis), only 1 in 10 incidents of negligent medical care amounted to the filing
of a claim; only 1 in 25 claims actually received compensation; and only 1 in 7 incidents where a patient suffered permanent disability resulted in filing a claim); Rake
& Thrasher, supra note 18, at 21 (reporting that, of the patients who are injured by
negligent care at NewYork state hospitals, only one in eight filed legal claims).
See Meschievitz, supra note 9, at 129 (citing empirical study documenting the

number of medical malpractice claims arising from emergency room and obstetrical
care in Florida between 1989 and 1990, as published in FRANK SLOAN ET AL., SUING
FoRMEDICAL MAIPRACncE 6 (1993)). The study found that typically only 44% of an
injured party's economic losses are covered. See id. Medical malpractice cases in
which awards are in the million-dollar range are the exception and inflate the average award figure. See Rake & Thrasher, supra note 18, at 22; see also Kenneth Jost,
Still Warring Over Medical Malpractice Time for Something Better, 79 A.B.A. J. 68, 71

(1993) (explaining that one study reported the average jury award as $367,737;
however, the study pointed out that this number is distorted by a small percentage
of large jury awards, and that the median award, which was only $36,500, is a better
indicator of actual jury verdicts). Furthermore, while a few claimants win exorbitant
awards in excess of their losses, such awards are often drastically reduced on appeal.
SeeJacobson, supra note 50, at 3323 (noting that courts reduced awards, on average,
by 33%, but finding that awards greater than one million dollars were reduced, on

average, by 39%).

SeeJacobson, supra note 50, at 3322; Jost, supra note 55, at 70 (referring to a
study documenting that defendants won trials in 18 out of 19 cases where insurers
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The concept that medical malpractice serves as a mechanism for
quality control is also increasingly scrutinized. 7 Specifically, malpractice does not adequately monitor physician competence and,
therefore, does not curtail the provision of incompetent medical
care." In theory, medical malpractice suits control the quality of
health care by forcing physicians to take the necessary safety precautions in an effort to avoid compensating negligently injured patients." The threat of litigation has traditionally provided little incentive for a physician to take precautions against the provision of
negligent medical care because insurance companies pay malpractice claims.6 Although physicians pay insurance premiums, these
premiums are not generally based on the physician's professional record.6 ' Rather, a physician's area of practice determines the appropriate premium.62 As a result, medical malpractice litigation fails to
anticipated a win, 13 out of 17 cases where the insurers thought the decision could
go either way, and 6 out of 11 cases where insurer expected a loss). But see Lozano,
supra note 46, at 40 (reporting that physicians suffer psychological trauma as a result of the process of malpractice litigation because they learn to see patients as potential threats and they come to view malpractice claims as judgments of their competence, rather than an inevitable part of the practice of medicine).
51 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 7, at 695-96 (discussing the problems with medical
malpractice suits as a mechanism to control the quality of health care).
4 See id.
59 SeeJost, supra note 5, at 572.
o SeeAdler, supra note 7, at 695. During the 1970s and again in the late 1980s,
the United States witnessed what has been termed the "medical malpractice crisis."
See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 36, at 196; Adler, supra note 7, at 684-89 (discussing
the medical malpractice crisis). During those periods, the dramatic increase in the
volume of medical malpractice suits produced sharp increases in insurance premiums. SeePRosSER ETAL., supranote 36, at 196. The medical profession, growing increasingly alarmed, demanded that state legislators address the problem and curb
the cost of insurance premiums. See id. Almost every state responded by passing
legislation that limited a claimant's right to file a medical malpractice claim. See id.
(noting, for example, that some states responded by changing the statute of limitations and limiting the amount of damages that could be awarded). It is beyond the
scope of this Note to address the specific aspects of state legislation regarding medical malpractice, but see Nancy M. Simone, Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: A
Comparative Analysis of United States and Great Britain, 12 SUFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
577, 578-89 (1989), and LouisrLL & WILuAms, supra note 42, 1 8.01, at 8-6 to 8-8 for
a more detailed discussion.
61 SeeAdler, supra note 7, at
695.
62
See id. Most insurance companies charge physicians group, or community
rated, premiums as opposed to experience rated premiums. SeeJost, supra note 5,
at 575; Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects
of Medical MalpracticeDamage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live nth Inefficient Doctors?7, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 11, 54 (1991). Group premiums mean that the premium
rate is based on group characteristics and location, whereas experience rated premiums mean that the premium price is based on the characteristics of a particular
physician. See id. at 54, 57. Group premiums further insulate physicians from the
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provide adequate deterrence to physicians from taking the necessary
precautions to avoid incompetent treatment.6
C. State Licensing Boards
Yet another mechanism for monitoring the competency of physicians is through state medical licensing boards. " State licensing
boards have the authority to regulate the practice of medicine

economic liability for medical errors because even a physician who is repeatedly
sued for incompetence will not witness a rise in insurance premiums. See id. at 56.
Some commentators argue that group premiums actually increase the incidence of
malpractice because physicians in the group have little incentive to take precautions
to avoid malpractice. See id. at 57. Furthermore, physicians with few incidents of
malpractice are discouraged from staying in the group because they do not want to
pay for risks that do not reflect their practice. See id. at 56.
63 SeeJost, supra note 5, at 575. The criticism that medical malpractice litigation
is an inadequate mechanism to control the quality of health care because it does
not deter incompetence has become less persuasive since the enactment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) in 1990. Cf.Robert E. Oshel et al., The NationalPractitionerData Bank: The First4 Years, 110 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 383, 38384 (July-Aug. 1995). This is so because currently all payments regarding a medical
malpractice claim made on behalf of a physician by an insurance company, whether
for an award or a settlement, must be reported to the NPDB. See id. at 384; see also
infra notes 107-122 (discussing the enactment and the requirements of the NPDB).
Moreover, prior to hiring, contracting with, or extending staff privileges to a physician, health care entities must query the NPDB for information concerning the physician, as they will be deemed to have knowledge of such information. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 11135(a)(1) (1994). Therefore, even though third parties make payments on
behalf of physicians, medical malpractice claims can have serious repercussions for
physicians seeking staffing privileges at hospitals or contracts with managed care
organizations. See Oshel et al., supra, at 384.
The enactment of the NPDB, however, does not completely rectify the inadequacies associated with medical malpractice litigation as a mechanism of quality
control. First, because the NPDB "serves only as a flagging system," health care entities have been warned to view the information cautiously rather than automatically
as a sign of a physician's incompetence. See id. at 384, 885. In addition, because a
physician may debate the factual basis of the reports and include a statement explaining the accuracy of the report in the NPDB, see id. at 385, the increased deterrent effect, afforded by the mandatory reporting requirements, may not adequately
deter a physician from failing in the first instance to take the necessary precautions
to avoid malpractice claims. Cf Adler, supra note 7, at 695. Finally, a very small
percentage of patients who experience incompetent medical care actually pursue a
medical malpractice claim. See Oshel et al., supra, at 384 (noting that "[less than 2
percent of injuries caused by medical negligence in the hospital setting lead to
malpractice claims, let alone payments"); see also supra note 54 (discussing statistical
evidence on the percentage of medical malpractice claims pursued). For a more
detailed discussion of the requirements and shortcomings of the NPDB, see infra
notes 106-135 and accompanying text.
See Kathleen L. Blaner, Comment, Physician Heal Thyself: Because the Cure,
The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May be Worse Than the Disease,37 CAT-. U. L. REV.
1073, 1079 (1988).
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through their police power. These boards may revoke a physician's
license to practice medicine for malpractice,6 gross negligence or
malpractice, 67 professional incompetence,68 or similar acts.6 9

The re-

ality is, however, that the revocation, or the suspension, of medical
licenses for incompetence is extremely rare.70 Instead, most of the
See id. at 1078 & n.31 (quoting Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 192-93
(1898) (explaining that "[nbo precise limits have been placed upon the police
power of a State, and yet it is clear that legislation which simply defines the qualifications of one who attempts to practice medicine is a proper exercise of that
power.")). Historically, physicians who were respected in the community were appointed to serve on the state boards. See id. These state boards issued licenses to
physicians deemed qualified to practice medicine and prevented unlicensed individuals, otherwise known as quacks, from practicing medicine. See id. As professional standards of conduct in the medical profession began to develop, the state
boards were also charged with monitoring the competency of licensed physicians.
See id. at 1078-79.
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:17(VI)(c), (VII)(c) (1955 & Supp. 1996)
(stating that New Hampshire's board may revoke licenses if it finds that the physician "[h]as displayed a pattern of behavior which is incompatible with the basic
knowledge and competence expected of persons licensed to practice medicine or
any particular aspect or specialty thereof.").
6 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-93-409(7) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1992) (speaking
of
"[g]rossly negligent or ignorant malpractice"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16(h) (West
1991) (referring to "gross malpractice or gross neglect in the practice of medicine
which has endangered the health or life of any person").
SeeIOWACODEANN. § 147.55(2) (West 1989) (listing "[pirofessional incompetency"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16(i) (specifying "professionally incompetent to
practice medicine").
69 See LouIsEiL & WILLiAMs, supra note 42, 8.01, at 8-6. Conduct that
is subject
to discipline in one state may not be subject to discipline in another state because
states enjoy complete sovereignty in determining the professional standards required to obtain, and to maintain, a medical license in that particular state. See
Blaner, supra note 64, at 1079-80.
70 SeeAdler, supranote 7, at 692 (noting that even though state
licensing boards
have begun to discipline more physicians, the overall numbers remain small and
unimpressive); William B. Schwartz & Daniel M. Mendelson, The Role of PhysicianOwned Insurance Companies in the Detection and Deterrence of Negligence, 262 JAMA 1342,
1345 (1989) (completing a study of 40 insurance companies owned by physicians,
and noting that physicians are eight times more likely to lose their malpractice insurance for substandard care than they are to lose their licenses); see also H.R. REP.
No. 99-903, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6385 (reporting that
"[u]nfortunately, groups such as state licensing boards, hospitals and medical societies that should be weeding out incompetent or unprofessional doctors often do not
do so"). The Public Citizen's Health Research Group's (Public Citizens) analysis
revealed that since 1993, of the 1622 physicians who were disciplined for incompetence or negligence nationwide, state licensing boards suspended only one-third,
and revoked only 10%, of these physicians' licenses. See Stuart Auerbach, Consumer
Group Lists 'QuestionableDoctors, Insufficient Punishmentfor Bad PracticeLeaves Patients
at Risk, Says Group, WAsH. PoST, Apr. 9, 1996, at Z7, available in 1996 WL 3073428
(referencing the Public Citizens' list of physicians who have been disciplined, titled
"13,012 Questionable Doctors," which was published in May of 1996). Within a
5
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serious disciplinary actions involve instances of providing inappropriate prescriptions or abusing drugs and alcohol.7 ' These charges
are easier for the board to prove than incompetence because the vast
amount of evidence for such charges is collected by law enforcement
authorities.72
There are several reasons for the overall ineffectiveness of state
licensing boards in weeding out incompetent physicians and successfully monitoring the quality of health care.73 To begin, state licensing boards are understaffed and underfunded.74 One or two physicians contesting disciplinary actions could deplete the boards'
limited budgets.7 Additionally, many board members are uncomfortable with judging their peers, a dilemma that inevitably surfaces
with self-policing systems.7 Furthermore, the receipt of information

week after the Public Citizens' publication, the Federation of State Medical Boards
refuted criticism of its performance stating that within one year there had been over
a seven percent increase in the number of serious penalties imposed against doctors. See id. Despite the increase in revocations and suspensions of physicians' licenses over the past five years, Public Citizens maintained that state boards were still
not sufficiently protecting the public from substandard medical care. See id.
11 See Adler, supra note 7, at 693 & nn.42-43 (citing OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND
INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DmFT. OF HFA.LTH AND HUMAN
SERviCFS, MEDICAL ICENSUREANDDLSCIPINE: AN OVERVIEW 16 (1986) (OIG Report);
see also Steinbrook & Ellis, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that one criticism of state
licensing boards is that most disciplinary actions focus on egregious behavior, such
as sexual misconduct with patients, prescribing drugs illegally, or bizarre treatments
(e.g., the injection of urine to treat cancer) rather than negligent medical care because negligence is more difficult to prove).
12 See Adler, supra note 7, at 693.
73

See id. at 693-94.

See id. at 693. For example, in 1990, the California Medical Board's yearly
budget provided for the expenditure of $78 per licensed physician for enforcement
purposes, as compared to the state bar's expenditure of $276 per attorney. See Steinbrook & Ellis, supra note 18, at 1. In addition, under-staffing created a six-month
time delay between the request for a disciplinary hearing and when it was actually
held. See id.
is See Adler, supra note 7, at 693 & n.47 (noting that a state licensing board's financial resources were significantly drained by a disciplinary proceeding that lasted
four months and cost over $100,000 in legal fees).
76 See id. at 693-94 & n.51 (citing an OIG Report that attributes this
reaction to
the "'brotherhood of silence,'" which refers to an "inherent resistance" to divulge
information against one's peers coupled with a fear of legal liability for reporting
such information); see also LAw & PoLAN, supranote 46, at 29 (quoting an editorial
by two physicians that stated: "'Every physician knows some colleague who has to be
watched carefully, an old friend or even teacher for whom he hesitates to bring
down the curtain even though he knows that the man or woman has advanced beyond his or her competence.'") (citation omitted). But see Blaner, supra note 64, at
1076 (detailing how the HCQA seeks to end the "brotherhood of silence"); infra
notes 118-35 and accompanying text (discussing the HCQIA).
74
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concerning incompetent practitioners is sparse." Information that is
obtained is usually provided by law enforcement agents and consumers,78 and not by other physicians, who are presumably the best
sources of such information." Furthermore, due process rights dis-

78

See Adler, supra note 7, at 694.
See id. at 739 & n.252 (noting that, according to a 1986 dIG Report, con-

sumer complaints are the major source of information for state licensing boards).
But see Jost, supra note 5, at 585 (explaining that consumer complaints are frequently discouraged).
*9 See Adler, supra note 7, at 694 (explaining that the sources most likely
to know
about a physician's incompetence, but the least likely to report this information to
boards, are hospitals, colleagues, medical societies, and peer review organizations);
see also infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing peer review organizations). A Colorado state health-facilities director, responsible for overseeing patient
safety at hospitals and nursing homes, explained that, except for fraud and abuse
cases, there are no written policies for reporting cases to regulatory agencies involving unexpected deaths. See Michael Romano, Unexpected Deaths Go Unpunished; No
Disciplinary Action Taken in 90% of Cases at Hospitals, Nursing Homes in Colorado,
Rocxy MT. NEws, Dec. 8, 1996, at 4A, available in 1996 WL 12360203. Rather,
whether such cases are referred to the correct authorities for investigation is left to
"professional discretion." See id. But seeJost, supranote 5, at 585 (noting that states
have enacted legislation mandating that medical professionals report incidents of
incompetence and providing immunity for those professionals who report). For
example, in NewJersey the law provides:
a. A physician or medical resident or intern, or podiatrist, hereinafter
referred to as a "practitioner," shall promptly notify the State Board of
Medical Examiners if that practitioner is in possession of information
which reasonably indicates that another practitioner has demonstrated an impairment, gross incompetence or unprofessional conduct
which would present an imminent danger to an individual patient or
to the public health, safety or welfare. A practitioner who fails to so
notify the board is subject to disciplinary action and civil penalties
pursuant to sections 8, 9, and 12 of P.L. 1978, c.73 (C:45:1-21 to 22
and 45:1-25).
b. There shall be no private right of action against a practitioner for
failure to comply with the reporting requirements of this section.
c. A practitioner who notifies the board about a practitioner who is
impaired or grossly incompetent or who has demonstrated unprofessional conduct pursuant to this section is not liable for damages to any
person for notifying the board unless the practitioner knowingly provided false information to the board.
d. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section to the contrary, a
practitioner is not required to notify the board about an impaired or
incompetent practitioner if he has knowledge of the practitioner's
impairment or incompetence as a result of rendering treatment to the
practitioner.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-19.5 (West 1991). The state mandatory reporting laws generally do not completely cure the lack of reporting of incompetent physicians because
the requirements of the statutes are vague and the penalties for failure to report are
minimal. SeeJost, supra note 5, at 585. Furthermore, when the person reporting'is
the supervisee, or close friend of the incompetent physician, the statutes are unlikely to have much effect. See id.
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lengthy delays in the system render the threat of sanctions a remote
possibility, thereby undermining the ability of state licensing boards

to deter incompetent behavior.8 '

In addition to these obstacles, there is concern that state licensing boards spend an inordinate amount of time and resources rehabilitating incompetent physicians rather than imposing sanctions to
the full extent.8 On the other hand, some argue that the state
boards are ineffective because the penalties are too drastic and, as a
result, the boards rarely impose the available sanctions. 8 Further,
many states' licensing boards have agreed to forgo disciplinary actions against a physician in return for the physician's promise never
to practice in the state again." As a result of such compromises, the
incompetent physicians leave the state and simply continue to practice in another state." Even when a state licensing board does take
So See, e.g., Franz v. Board of Med. Quality Assurance, 642 P.2d 792, 797, 800
(Cal. 1982) (maintaining that record must provide sufficient evidence to allow for
judicial review and concluding that board's evidence was insufficient to support
finding that physician was grossly negligent); Leone v. Division of Med. Quality,
Nos. B103344, B101297, 1997 WL 587303, at *1, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1997)
(holding that state statute denying physicians direct appeal from superior court's
affirmation of state licensing board's disciplinary action was unconstitutional because physicians have the constitutional right to appellate review to determine sufficiency of evidence in the record).
8e SJost, supra note 5, at 586-87; see also, e.g., Steinbrook & Ellis, supra note 18,
at 1 (reporting that the California State Licensing Board had over 600 patient complaints waiting to be investigated, and that once assigned, the investigations would
last up to four years).
n See Auerbach, supra note 70, at Z7 (reporting that the director of Public Citizens argued, "Medical Boards are much too forgiving. Many still see their priority
as rehabilitation, and their disciplinary actions are too light."); Steinbrook & Ellis,
supra note 18, at 1 (noting that the president of an organization that represents
over half of the physicians in California opined that the board was simply "not
tough enough"); see alsoJost,supra note 5, at 583 (explaining that although state
licensing boards have the authority to revoke physicians' medical licenses, they are
unlikely to resort to such a severe sanction in a case of incompetency).
SSeeJost,

supra note 5, at 586. Some commentators argue that if state licensing

boards had the authority to impose intermediate disciplinary sanctions, such as retraining and counseling, the boards would be more effective in monitoring incompetent physicians. See Auerbach, supra note 70, at Z7 (quoting a professor, and
former surgeon, of Harvard University's School of Public Health who observed:
"Everyone thinks it is an all-or-nothing situation in which a doctor should lose his
license if he makes a mistake. We don't treat anyone else like that.").
SeeAdler, supra note 7, at 691.
See Auerbach, supra note 70, at Z7; see also Adler, supra note 7, at 691-92
(reporting that, according to the General Accounting Office, out of 122 physicians
disciplined by state licensing boards, 49 physicians continued their practice after
relocating to another state); Blaner, supra note 64, at 1081 & n.58 (reporting that a
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disciplinary action against a physician and the information about the
final disciplinary action is made available to the public, acquiring
that information is often difficult and time consuming.8
In sum, state medical licensing boards do afford some protection against inadequate medical care by requiring physicians to possess minimum qualifications.7 This is where the protection ends,
however, because once physicians have their licenses, state licensing
boards tend to be ineffective at removing physicians who fail to retain these minimum qualifications."
Therefore, state licensing
bargain was made between the Pennsylvania Licensing Board and an incompetent
physician in which the board agreed to forgo imposing disciplinary action against
the physician in exchange for the physician's promise to cease practicing medicine
in the state). But see infra notes 100-35 and accompanying text (discussing HCQIA
and the NPDB-federal legislation enacted to curtail relocating from state to state).
See, e.g., Steinbrook & Ellis, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that due to
understaffing and ill-equipped phone systems, a consumer calling a state licensing board
is likely to get a busy signal); see also Sarah Glazer, How Much Do You Know About
Your Doctor?, WASH. Posr, Mar. 5, 1991, at Z10, available in 1991 WL 2152699
(noting that an investigator for the California Medical Board advises consumers to
visit the local courthouse and examine the civil suit index to see if there are any
pending or finaljudgments against their physicians).
Even when consumers are able to contact the state board, the information they
obtain from the board may be of little value. See id. (providing an example of a
woman who, when debating whether to have cosmetic surgery, decided to contact
the state medical board about her prospective surgeon and was told that there was
no negative information on the doctor). Believing the surgeon to be competent,
the woman had the operation, which resulted in a post-surgical infection that
threatened her life. See id. The board failed to tell her that the surgeon had been
under investigation by the board for over two years and had 11 malpractice suits
filed against him. See id. This information was not revealed because the state
board, like most state boards in the country, had a policy of not revealing information regarding pending medical malpractice suits, consumer complaints, or investigations, unless they resulted in an official conclusion of guilt by the board. See id.
(reporting that the president of the AMAjustified the policy of silence based on the
"innocent until proven guilty" theory of the American legal system).
The problem of acquiring information about incompetent physicians has been
somewhat alleviated for hospitals and state licensing boards by the establishment of
the NPDB, which, pursuant to the HCQIA, requires that disciplinary actions taken
against physicians be reported; however, consumers do not have access to this information. See Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice; Releasing PhysicianSpecific Data to the Public, 8 Lov. CONSUMER L. RaP. 125, 126-28 & n.15 (1995-96)
(noting that while the NPDB fails to provide information to the general public, the
State of Massachusetts has established alternative procedures for such disclosure);
see also infranotes 109-35 and accompanying text (discussing the NPDB).
See FuRRow ET AL., supranote 47, at 102.
as See id. One example of the inadequacy and dangers of current state disciplinary systems is the case of Dr. Milo Klvana, an obstetrician who was convicted of
second-degree murder in 1990 for the deaths of a fetus and eight newborns. See
People v. Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 514-16 (Ct. App. 1993), habeus corpus denied
sub nom. Klvana v. California, 911 F. Supp. 1288, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The atrocity
of the case was exacerbated by evidence that Dr. Klvana's incompetence had been

1997]

PROSECUTIONOFINCOMPETENT PHYSICIANS

589

boards do little to assure the optimal level of quality care for patients."

accumulating for years without a proper investigation. See Steinbrook & Ellis, supra
note 18, at 1.
Dr. Klvana, who obtained a medical degree in Czechoslovakia, failed to complete his fourth year of residency at a New York medical center because he performed poorly on the Council on Resident Education in Obstetrician and Gynecology Examination and improperly administered medication. See Kivana, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 515. These deficiencies precluded Dr. Klvana from becoming the chief
resident at the medical center and prevented him from taking the board certification examination for obstetrics. See id. Despite these events, however, Dr. Klvana
was granted a California medical license and was accepted into a two-year residency
program in anesthesiology at a California university hospital. See id. When the faculty at the university hospital determined that Dr. Klvana was performing incompetently, Dr. Klvana resigned from the residency program. See id. (noting that one
faculty member explained that Dr. Klvana was "cavalier and casual in his approach
and his duties, not performing them in a manner that really would indicate the utmost care for his patients"). The medical staff recommended that Dr. Klvana avoid
practicing medicine in those areas where the patient's safety is an issue on a moment-to-moment basis. See id. Subsequently, Dr. Klvana was granted staff privileges
at another California hospital after having misrepresented to the hospital that he
was board certified in obstetrics and gynecology. See id. When the hospital voiced
its concern over the abnormally high number of premature infants born under Dr.
Kivana's care and required him to obtain second opinions for his patients, Dr.
Klvana resigned. See id. at 515-16. Dr. KIvana continued this pattern of applying for
staff privileges at area hospitals until he opened his own clinic. See id. at 516.
Dr. Klvana was eventually placed on probation for five years by the California
Medical Board for the incorrect use of a labor-inducing drug. See id. at 516 n.7.
The Board reduced his probation by three years, however, and failed subsequently
to monitor the doctor. See Steinbrook & Ellis, supra note 18, at 1. The newborn
deaths for which Dr. Klvana was charged with murder were attributed to Dr.
Klvana's improper use of a labor-inducing drug. See id. When the California Medical Board finally commenced an investigation into the deaths, the Board relied
heavily on Dr. Klvana's own account of the incidents and ignored the opinion of
medical experts who found Dr. Klvana's practice to be grossly negligent. See id.
Furthermore, the Board took no action to prevent Dr. Klvana from practicing until
he had already been in prison for over a year. See id.
After sentencing Dr. Klvana to fifty-three years in prison, Judge Chirlin chastised the California Medical Board, stating that the Board was partially responsible
for the deaths because of its failure to perform its function-protecting the public
by monitoring incompetent physicians. See id. Judge Chirlin further declared the
case "'a testament to the abject failure'" of the California Medical Board See id. In
response to the judge's criticism, the president of the Board explained, "You will
always find an outlandish case or a problem case, something that could go through
the cracks," but insisted that California did not have a "big problem" with disciplining~physicians. Id.
See FuRRow ET"AL., supra note 47, at 102; see also Louis_.LL & WniAms, supra
note 42, 8.01, at 8-6 (suggesting that the expansion of malpractice law is a product
of state licensing boards' ineffectiveness in monitoring and preventing medical negligence).
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D. ProfessionalDisciplinarySystems
The professional disciplinary systems offer an additional
mechanism to regulate the quality of health care." Specifically, the
medical profession has long relied on peer review to monitor the
professionalism of physicians' conduct. 9 Peer review is essentially a
self-regulating police system in which committees of physicians review and evaluate the quality of their colleagues' work.9 Ultimately,
the goal of peer review is to protect patients from poor medical care
by having other physicians, who possess the requisite expertise necessary to make an informed judgment, determine what constitutes a
deficient pattern of medical care and what warrants disciplinary actions." In the United States, most physicians are subject to some
form of peer review."
SeeAdler, supra note 7, at 696.
91 See id; see also Erich H. Loewy, Guidelines, Managed Care, and Ethics, 156
90

ARcHivEs OF IrTrNAL MED. 2038, availablein 1996 WL 8987263 (1996) (noting that,

initially, peer review committees met resistance from physicians; however, strong
pressures outside the profession forced the adoption of this form of self-policing).
See Adler, supra note 7, at 696. Peer review is "the evaluation by practicing
physicians of the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of services ordered or performed by other physicians." WIuIJAM P. IsEIz, THE HosPrrAL MricAL STAFF; IT'S
LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 126 (1984).
93 See Paul L. Scibetta, Note, RestructuringHospital-PhysicianRelations: Patient Care
Quality Depends on the Health of HospitalPeer Review, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1025, 1032-33
(1990).
See Adler, supra note 7, at 696-97 (noting that because Medicare mandates
peer review when physician services are reimbursed, most physicians undergo some
form of peer review); see alsojost, supra note 5, at 542-43 & n.108, 554 (explaining
that state law and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), a body that accredits health care institutions, require quality assurance programs to evaluate physicians who practice within these institutions).
One form of peer review practiced at most hospitals in the United States is "the
medical staff privilege system." Id. at 554. In most hospitals throughout the United
States, physicians are independent contractors, as opposed to hospital employees,
and must be granted staff privileges to admit patients to the hospital. See id. at 55354. The hospital's governing board grants staff privileges based on the existing
medical staff's recommendation. See id. at 554. Once on the medical staff, a physician's practice is periodically monitored to detect patterns of unacceptable care. See
id. If an unacceptable pattern of care is detected, a peer review committee, composed of physicians who generally are volunteers, investigates the problem and
makes recommendations concerning possible disciplinary actions, such as requiring
further education, supervising the physicians, or even revoking staff privileges. See
Scibetta, supra note 93, at 1032-33.
In addition to hospital peer review, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) contracts with Peer Review Organizations (PROs) to review the quality of
physicians' care provided to Medicare patients. See Peter E. Dans et al., Peer Review
Organizations;Promises and Potential Pitfals, 313 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1131-32
(1985); R. Heather Palmer, Quality Health Care, 275 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1996). Usu-
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Despite the goal of peer review to detect and correct poor
medical care, peer review's contribution to assuring quality care is
limited." Several reasons explain why the peer review system is often
an ineffective mechanism for monitoring incompetent physicians.
To begin, many physicians are firm believers in the adage "'there but
for the grace of God go I'" and consequently tend to be extremely
adverse to passing judgment on their colleagues' professional conduct.'7 Furthermore, physicians on peer review committees must
volunteer their time; they are not financially compensated. 8 In addition, the threat of litigation provides a strong disincentive to serve on
peer review committees."
ally, local physicians comprise the PROs, and in some instances the state medical
societies own the PROs. See id. PROs monitor the provision of health care by reviewing patient profile data, beneficiaries complaints, and medical records. See
Timothy StoltzfusJost, Policing Cost Containment: The Medicare Peer Review Organization Program, 14 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 483, 498 (1991). When a quality problem
is detected, the responsible physician, or health care institution, must adhere to a
"corrective action plan," which often requires further education, training, and
monitoring. See id. at 499. If the institution or physician fails to comply with the
corrective action plan, the PRO may recommend to the Inspector General's Office
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that sanctions be taken,
either in the form of civil fines or exclusion from the medicare program. See id.
For a detailed discussion and critical assessment of PROs see generallyJost, supra,at
486-526.
In the area of managed care, a system called utilization review (UR) is used to
monitor the provision of medical treatment by physicians. See Brian P. Battaglia,
The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging Liability Claims Aising From Utilization
Management and FinancialIncentive Arrangements Between Health Care Providersand Payers, 19 U. ARK. LrrriE RocK L.J. 155, 170 (1997). Typically in the UR process, registered nurses review subscribers' cases to determine whether the proposed care falls
within the managed care organization's utilization standards. See id. at 172. If it is
determined that the treatment does not fall within the utilization standards, the
case is referred to UR physicians for further analysis. See id. UR serves several functions, including monitoring medical professionals' practice patterns for both cost
containment and quality of care purposes. See id. at 171.
95 SeeJost, supra note 5, at 554.
Adler, supra note 7, at 697.
See id. Essentially, physicians can empathize with the serious consequences
of
revoking a colleagues' staff privileges or medical license; this may explain why physicians on peer review committees are often hesitant to press for disciplinary action.
See id.
See id. (explaining that physicians who participate in peer review committees
"make neither money nor friends").
99 See id. In the past, physicians disciplined by peer review
committees have
sued committee members for defamation, malicious interference with contractual
relations, and denial of due process. See id. at 697-98; see also, e.g., McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 900, 917 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (involving a doctor
that brought action against physicians, hospital, and board of trustees alleging,
among other things, that the defendants interfered with the physician's contractual
relation when they removed him from the directorship of his department); Maimon
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Congress enacted the Heath Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (HCQIA)'* to combat some of the problems outlined above.'

Specifically, the HCQIA seeks to encourage physicians to participate
in peer review by providing immunity from damages under any state
or federal law.'0 2 Immunity under the HCQIA extends to "peer rev. Sisters of the Third Order, 491 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (concerning
hospital that followed procedure set forth in its bylaws for the expulsion of a hospital staff member; therefore exclusion did not violate due process); Hayden v. Foryt,
407 So. 2d 535, 536-38 (Miss. 1981) (comprising situation where staff anesthetist
sued chief anesthetist and hospital for damages resulting from alleged defamation
after chief anesthetist reported the staff anesthetist's incidents of inadequate care).
To encourage peer review, a number of states enacted "shield laws" aimed at
providing immunity for those physicians who serve on peer review committees. See
Adler, supra note 7, at 698 & n.77 (citing The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986: Hearingson H.R. 5540, Before Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
House Committee onJudiciary,99th Cong. 75 (1986) (statement of Marilyn C. Furay));
see also Scibetta, supra note 93, at 1034 n.28 (citing several state "shield laws" that
provide varying degrees of immunity). Physicians denied staff privileges based on
the recommendation of peer review committees countered state shield laws by filing
antitrust lawsuits claiming anticompetitive abuses. SeeAdler, supra note 7, at 697-98.
In Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988), the best known case in this area, see Adler,
supra note 7, at 698 n. 7 9, the Supreme Court upheld ajudgment of nearly two million dollars against a peer review organization that abused the review process in an
effort to exclude the plaintiff-physician from the local market. See Burget, 486 U.S.
at 98, 105-06. See also Adler, supra note 7, at 698 n.79 for citations of additional
antitrust cases.
100 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (1994). See Adler, supra note 7, at 700-17
for a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the HCQIA.
101 See Pauline Martin Rosen, Comment, Medical Staff Peer Review: Qualifying the
Qualified PriviegeProvision, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 357, 361 (1993) (noting that Congress enacted the HCQIA to combat criticism of the peer-review system used to selfpolice the medical profession); Louise M. Joy, Comment, The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986: A Proposalfor Interpretationof Its Protection, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
955, 962-63 (1989) (explaining that the goal of the HCQA is to encourage physicians to participate in peer review).
102 See Robert E. Kuelthau, Ambulatoy Surgery Centers-MedicalClinics and
the National PractitionerData Bank, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 819, 820 (1996). In pertinent part,
the HCQIA provided the following congressional findings:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need
to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by
any individual State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent
physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery
of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal Laws,
including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and pro-
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view actions"'03 taken against physicians and not to peer review actions taken against other health care professionals, such as nurses."'
Furthermore, the immunity provision applies only when the "peer
review board"0 5 takes action against a physician for unprofessional
conduct or incompetence.
In addition to the immunity provision, the HCQIA also includes
a mandatory reporting provision.
The mandatory reporting provision was included to combat the pervasive problem of incompetent
physicians resigning from health care institutions and continuing
their practice elsewhere before disciplinary actions could be taken
against them.'"4 Congress established the National Practitioner Data
tection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
42 U.S.C. § 11101. The HCQIA provides that persons participating in peer review
actions that meet the requirements of the statute "shall not be [held] liable in damages under any law of the United States or any State (or political subdivision
thereof) with respect to the action." Id. § 11111(a). The HCQIA immunity does
not extend to damages under state or federal laws relating to civil rights. See id.
Furthermore, the immunity provision applies only to private antitrust suits, as the
Attorney General retains the power to bring an antitrust action. See id.
103 Peer review action, or more specifically "professional review action," is
defined in the HCQIA to mean
an action or recommendation of a professional review body which is
taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity, which is
based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health
or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect)
adversely the clinical privileges, or membership in a professional society, of the physician.
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9).
104 See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 47, at 817. Although not
required, the HCQIA
also permits health care entities to report peer review actions taken against health
care professionals other than physicians if the underlying conduct would require
reporting if committed by a physician. See Adler, supra note 7, at 733 & n.232; see
also infra note 112 (discussing reportable peer review actions).
105 The term peer review board, or more specifically "professional review body,"
is defined as "a health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a
health care entity which conducts professional review activity, and includes any
committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing body
in a professional review activity." 42 U.S.C. § 11151(11).
1W See id. § 11151(9). Specifically excluded from the definition
of peer review
actions are a physician's membership, or lack of membership, in a professional society, fees and advertising, employment status in group health plans, association
with a private group practice, and any other activity not based upon the physician's
professional conduct or competence. See id.; see also Henry A. Waxman, Sounding
Board Medical Malpracticeand Quality of Care, 316 NEw ENG.J. MED. 943, 943 (1987)
(explaining that the HCQIA immunity provision extends only to physicians disciplining other physicians through the peer review system for incompetence, and
then only if the procedures used were fair).
07

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137.

108 See Waxman, supra note 106, at 943; see also Karen Sandrick, Two Years and
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Bank (NPDB)' °g to gather and provide information regarding disciplinary actions taken against physicians."0 Health care entities.. and
state licensing boards that conduct peer review activities are required
to report information regarding peer review actions taken against
physicians for incompetent or unprofessional conduct. 2 In addiRunning the National PractitionerData Bank Begins to Roll, But Issues Remain, HospiTALS, Feb. 5, 1993, at 44 (noting that the mandatory reporting requirement of the
HCQIA in the first two years resulted in disciplinary action taken against an estimated 6000 "gypsy physicians" (physicians who move from one state to the next to
avoid disciplinary actions)). The legislative history of the HCQA found that
"[e]ven when [licensing boards and hospitals] do act against bad physicians, these
physicians find it all to easy to move to different hospitals or states and continue
their practices in these new locations." H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 2 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6884, 6385.
10 See 42 C.F.R. § 60 (1994). The NPDB began operation on September 1, 1990.
See Oshel et al., supra note 63, at 383. The Division of Quality Assurance, Bureau of
Health Professions, Health Resource and Services Administration, Public Health
Service oversees the NPDB program. See id.
110 See 42 C.F.R. § 60.1.
III The term "health care entity" is broadly defined by the act and includes third
party payers. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(4) (A). Pursuant to the HCQIA, the term
"health care entity" includes the following:
(i) a hospital that is licensed to provide health care services by the
State in which it is located,
(ii) an entity (including a health maintenance organization or group
medical practice) that provides health care services and that follows a
formal peer review process for the purpose of furthering quality
health care...

, and

(iii) subject to subparagraph (B), a professional society (or committee thereof) of physicians or other licensed health care practitioners
that follows a formal peer review process for the purpose of furthering
quality health care ....
Id.

112 See Kuelthau, supra note 102, at 819. Within 15 days
after a reportable peer
review action, the health care entity must submit a NPDB Adverse Action Report
(NPDB report), which includes the physician's name and a description of the reason for taking the action. See id. at 827. Peer review actions are reportable ifA physician's application for medical staff appointment is denied
based on the professional competence or conduct. (However, a denial
based upon failure to meet the initial credentialing criteria applied to
all medical staff or clinical privilege applicants is not reportable.)
A physician's request for clinical privileges is denied or restricted,
based upon an assessment of his or her current clinical competence as
defined by the health care entity.
A physician voluntarily restricts or surrenders his clinical privileges while his professional competence or conduct is under investigation, or in return for an agreement not to conduct an investigation of
his professional competence and/or conduct.
Based on an assessment of his professional conduct, a proctor is
assigned to a physician and the physician must be granted approval by
the proctor before certain medical care is administered.
Although not specifically set forth as an example in the Guide-

1997]

PROSECUTION OFINCOMPETENTPHYSICIANS

595

tion, information concerning medical malpractice settlements and
payments must be reported."" Failure to report a peer review action
could result in the loss of the health care entity's peer review immunity." 4 Moreover, it is the duty of each health care entity to request
information from the NPDB prior to extending staff privileges or
employing physicians"" and to review information every two years rebook, it is likely that the denial of membership in a medical clinic
based on professional competence or conduct would also be a reportable action.
Id. at 826 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., NATIONAL PRACTITIONER
DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK E-22-23 (1994) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK]). Peer review actions are non-reportable if:
Based on an assessment of [a physician's] professional competence, a
proctor is assigned to supervise a physician, but a proctor is not required to grant approval before medical care is provided by the physician.
If a physician voluntarily restricts or surrenders his clinical privileges for personal reasons when his professional competence and/or
conduct is not under investigation.
If a physician is denied medical staff appointment or clinical
privileges because the health care entity already has too many specialists in the individual's discipline.
If a physician's privileges are suspended because of failure to
complete a patient's chart in accordance with the health care entity's
policy.
Id. at 826-27 (quoting GUIDEBOOK, supra, at E-22-23). NPDB reports are submitted
by the health care entity to the state medical board with the authority to monitor
and discipline physicians. See id. at 827. Within 15 days after receiving a NPDB report, the state board is responsible for forwarding the report to the NPDB. See id.
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 60.5(c)). Within 30 days, state medical boards must report licensure actions relating to a physician's professional conduct or competence that (1)
suspend or revoke the license; (2) place on probation, reprimand, or censure the
physician; and (3) require the physician to surrender the license. See 45 C.F.R. §§
60.5(b), 60.8(a).
1
See FURROW ETAL., supra note 47, at 55. The HCQA requires any entity,
even
if not otherwise subject to the provisions of the Act, to report any "payment under a
policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of ajudgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim"
made for the benefit of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (explaining that insurance companies fall under the medical malpractice reporting provision). The information must be reported to the NPDB within 30 days after the date payment was
made. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.5(a). Physicians argue that the malpractice information
contained in the NPDB is incomplete because it fails to take into account the purely
economic reasons that may force a physician to agree to a settlement. See Brian
McCormick, It's Baaaaaaack;Clinton Would Open DataBank AJter AU, Name 'Repeat Offenders, 'AM. MED. NEws, Dec. 6, 1993, at 2, availablein 1993 WL 12219323.
114 See Kuelthau, supra note 102, at 827. A health care entity is given notice when
it fails to submit the report and is provided with an opportunity to rectify the failure. See id. However, if the problem persists, the health care entity will lose its immunity regarding peer review actions for three years. See id.
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a)(1).
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garding the entire medical staff.16 It is important that the health
care entity fulfill its duty to obtain information because it is presumed to have knowledge of the information reported to the NPDB
regardless of whether it actually obtains the information. 7
The HCQIA also contains a provision addressing disclosure and
confidentiality requirements." 8 A physician can request the information in his or her file and can dispute the accuracy of the information. 9 In addition, upon request, information is disclosed to state
licensing boards, hospitals, and other health care entities, including
managed care organizations (MCOs) that are contemplating, or have
already entered into, an employment or affiliation arrangement with
a physician. '2 In general, the information reported to the NPDB is
confidential and will only be disclosed if requested for peer review
activities that further the quality of health care. 2 ' Violation of the
confidentiality provision of the HCQIA could result in serious civil
penalties.'2
Although the enactment of the HCQIA, which established the
NPDB, was a major advancement towards assuring quality health
care, the HCQIA is not the final solution towards identifying and
disciplining incompetent physicians.13 Health care entities and state
licensing boards are still ultimately responsible for monitoring or
removing incompetent doctors from the medical profession.' 4 The
HCQIA does not provide a mechanism for disciplining physicians; it
See id. § 11135(a) (2).
See id. § 11135(b).
See id. §§ 11136-11187.
See id. § 11136. See generally Diane M. Gianelli, PractitionerData Bank Begins
Sept. 1; Confidentiality Remains Key Concern, AM. MMD. NEws, July 27, 1990, at 1, available in 1990 WL 3259802 (discussing procedures available to physicians for disputing information contained in their NPDB files).
, See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(a).
1
See id. § 11137(b) (1), (3). Information that does not identify the physician,
patient, or health care entity is not deemed confidential. See id. § 11137(b)(1).
1
See id. § 11137(b) (2) (for each violation, a person will be subject to a civil fine
up to $10,000). When asked what mechanisms are in place to prevent a plaintiff's
attorney or an insurance company from pretending to be an entity authorized to
have access to information in the NPDB, a doctor for the Health Resources Services
Administration, a division of HI-IS, responded, "Only the chance that they will be
caught." Gianelli, supra note 119, at 1. The doctor explained, however, that those
unauthorized to request information would likely be caught because, at a physician's request, the NPDB discloses the names of persons and entities requesting
that physician's information. See id.
2
See Oren L. Zeve, Physician Discipline: Considerationsfor National Policy, 13 IN
PUB. INTERws 1, 26-27 (1993).
124 SeeAdler, supranote 7, at 737.
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merely provides immunity for peer review to health care entities and
state licensing boards.'" Furthermore, because the HCQIA does not
require that all adverse information be reported to the NPDB, health
care entities can circumvent the reporting requirement by sanctioning incompetent physicians such that the disciplinary action need
not be reported.'"
The general public cannot obtain information contained in the
NPDB'2 nor can consumers report information concerning inade-

1

I

See id. at 737-38.

See 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (a) (1) (A). The HCQIA requires health care entities to

report any "professional review action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of
a physician for a period longer than 30 days." Id. Therefore, one way a health care
entity can circumvent the reporting requirement is to discipline a physician for less
than 30 days. See Zeve, supra note 123, at 26 (noting that one gap in the HCQIA is
the exclusion of disciplinary sanctions under thirty days).
1
See Miller, supra note 86, at 126; see also FuRRow ET AL., supra note 47, at 55
(noting that in very limited circumstances, plaintiffs' attorneys can gain access to
information in the NPDB). As discussed previously, information regarding state
licensing boards' disciplinary actions is generally available to consumers, although it
can prove to be very time consuming and difficult to obtain. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. The New York State Board of Regents recently made licensing
and disciplining information concerning physicians, among other professionals,
available to consumers via the Internet. See Dan Barry, Questions About a Professional's Standing? An Answer's on the Web, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1997, at L31. In addition, a hyperlink to the New York State Health Department's Office of Professional
Medical Conduct, accessible from the education department's web site, allows consumers to access information concerning a physician's disciplinary history. See id.
Other states, including Massachusetts and Texas, provide similar information to
consumers. See id. In 1994, Massachusetts's Secretary of Consumer Affairs appointed an advisory committee to determine what information should be disseminated to the general public in response to allegations that the State Board of Registration in Medicine was too lenient, and that the non-disclosure policy concerning
physicians was no longer a wise policy. See Miller, supra note 86, at 127. The committee identified four broad disclosure categories: (1) education and training, (2)
malpractice claims history, (3) disciplinary sanctions by the licensing board and
hospitals, and (4) criminal convictions. See id. at 128-33. For a detailed discussion
of Massachusetts's disclosure systems, see generally Jeffrey P. Donohue, Developing
Issues Under the Massachusetts 'PhysicianProfile Act,' 23 AM.J.L. & MED. 115 (1997). It
has been suggested that, because the NPDB contains information similar to that
found in state licensing and disciplinary reports, there is no valid reason to prohibit
disclosing this information to the public. See Adler, supra note 7, at 739-40
(proposing the establishment of a national toll-free hotline whereby consumers
could phone the NPDB for information concerning their physician). At one point,
the Clinton Administration proposed to open the NPDB to the public regarding
physicians who settled multiple medical malpractice claims. See McCormick, supra
note 113, at 2; see also Ann Schrader, Doctor-DataDemand Grows; Deaths Fuel Public
Outcry, DE.Nv. PosT, Sept. 17, 1995, at Al, availablein 1995 WL 10197583 (reporting
that in 1995, United States Representative Ron Wyden (D-Or.) planned to propose
opening the NPDB to the public).

598

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:569

quate health care they may have received. 128 Therefore, consumers
remain at the mercy of health care entities and state licensing boards
to protect them from incompetent physicians." The father of a little
See Adler, supranote 7, at 739 (noting that, with the exception of malpractice
claims that end in a settlement or award and disciplinary actions by state licensing
boards pursuant to patient complaints, a consumer cannot register a complaint with
the NPDB).
12 An investigator for a state licensing board cautioned
that consumers should
be wary of physicians who do not have hospital staff privileges, explaining that "it's
always the bad ones" who do not have privileges. Glazer, supra note 86, at Z10. A
devastating example of the HCQIA's inability to cure the problems of peer review is
the case of Dr. Joseph Verbrugge. See Bensel & Goldberg, supranote 3, at B10. Dr.
Verbrugge, an anesthesiologist in Colorado, was charged with reckless manslaughter in connection with the death of an eight-year-old boy. See id.; see also COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(1) (a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996) (pronouncing that "[a] person commits the crime of manslaughter if... [sluch person recklessly causes the
death of another person."); id. § 18-1-501(8) (ruling that "[a] person acts recklessly
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will
occur or that a circumstance exists."); Sue Lindsay, Jurors Will Hear How Doctor Fell
Asleep During 4 Surgeries, RocKY MTN. PosT, May 17, 1996, at 20A, available in 1996
WL 7569166 [hereinafter Lindsay I] (explaining that a conviction would require
the prosecutor to prove that Dr. Verbrugge "consciously disregarded a substantial
risk or verifiable risk" that the youth would die as a result of the doctor's behavior).
Dr. Verbrugge's attorney maintained that the death was caused by malignant
hyperthermia (MH), a rare genetic reaction to the anesthetic drugs. See Howard
Pankratz, Doctor Faults Verbrugge in Death; Earlier Testimony That Anesthesiologist Fell
Asleep DuringBoy's Surgery Backed, DEzy. PosT, Sept. 16, 1995, at B3, availablein 1995
WL 10197432 [hereinafter Pankratz I]. According to the prosecution, however,
many children show signs similar to the symptoms of MH when first placed under
anesthesia; therefore, an anesthesiologist should be on the alert when treating pediatric patients. See id. The prosecution claimed that the boy's death was the result
of a combination of a "clogged airway and overheating that caused carbon dioxide
to build up to toxic levels." Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3, at B10. Furthermore,
although maintaining that the cause of death was not MH, the prosecutor argued
that an MH death was preventable because a special anesthesia machine and an antidote for MH were both available at the hospital. See Pankratz I, supra, at B3.
An investigation into the incident revealed that Dr. Verbrugge failed to react to
complications during a routine ear surgery because the doctor fell asleep for short
intervals during the three-hour operation. See Howard Pankratz, Witness: Verbrugge
Said He Corrected "Nodding Off, "DENv. PoST, Oct. 5, 1996, at B3, available in 1996 WL
12633156 [hereinafter Pankratz II]. Further, investigation revealed that Dr. Verbrugge had fallen asleep during several other operations prior to the fatal incident.
See id.; see also Sara Lewis, Doctor Dozed in Other Operations, Nurses Testify, DENV. PoST,
Apr. 25, 1996, at B6, availablein 1996 WL 6691528 (reporting that one nurse spoke
with Dr. Verbrugge concerning his falling asleep and another nurse wrote reports
about the incidents); Physician on Trial in Boy's Death; Colorado Alleges Anesthesiologist
Had History of Dozing Off, CHI. TRig., Oct. 13, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL
2716908 (noting that a colleague thought that Dr. Verbrugge had a drug problem
and another colleague suggested techniques to Dr. Verbrugge for staying awake and
alert during surgery). Unfortunately, because the hospital had only reprimanded
the doctor on those occasions, as opposed to suspending his privileges for over 30
days, the prior incidents were not reportable to the Colorado State Medical Board
128
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boy who died during a routine ear operation summed up the current
state of affairs concerning the public's inability to acquire pertinent
information about medical professionals: "I can find out more
about my plumber than I can about my doctor." " Recognizing the
and hence were not reportable to the NPDB. See Sue Lindsay, Doctor Was Warned
About SleIping, Court Told, Rocway MTN. NEws, Oct. 5, 1996, at 26A, available in 1996
WL 12349556 [hereinafter Lindsay II] (stating that six months before the child's
death, medical officers at the hospital had warned Dr. Verbrugge about his propensity for falling asleep during surgery). An administrator for the state medical board
explained that having privileges suspended for even one day are reportable to the
state board, but admitted that physicians typically resign to prevent such reporting.
See Schrader, supranote 127, at Al. Dr. Verbrugge's prior incidents were discovered
by the medical board only after the doctor was charged with manslaughter and a
formal request was made for his peer review file. See Bensel & Goldberg, supranote
3, at B1O.
Ajury found Dr. Verbrugge guilty of grossly negligent medical care because his
conduct represented "an extreme deviation from generally accepted standards of
medical care." Howard Pankratz, Verbrugge to Face Tial Again; Date Set for Manslaughter Case, Drv. PoST, Nov. 13, 1996, at Bi, available in 1996 WL 12636564
[hereinafter Pankratz III]. Grossly negligent medical care is a misdemeanor that
carries a $1000 fine and a maximum prison term of up to 12 months. See id. As to
the manslaughter charge, a deadlocked jury forced a retrial. See Sue Lindsay, Doctor
Faces Second Trial in Boy's Death; FirstJury Was Split on Felony Charge Against Anesthesiologist, Rocxy MTN. NEws, Nov. 13, 1996, at 4A, available in 1996 WL 12356143
[hereinafter Lindsay III]; Pankratz III, supra, at B1 (explaining that the jury split
ten-to-two in favor of convicting Dr. Verbrugge of manslaughter but that the two jurors who voted for not guilty thought the cause of death was MH). DistrictJudge
Dick Spriggs rejected the defense's argument that a retrial on the manslaughter
charge would amount to doublejeopardy. See id.
The Colorado Board of Medical Examiners revoked Dr. Verbrugge's license after an administrative lawjudge determined that the doctor was grossly negligent for
failing to monitor the condition of his patient. See Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3,
at B10. Specifically, Dr, Verbrugge was grossly negligent for "failing to calibrate the
anesthesia machine, failing to monitor the patient during surgery, failing to respond to evidence of a developing crisis and failing to remain awake and otherwise
alert and vigilant." Id. Nevertheless, in November 1995, it was reported that the
State of California granted Dr. Verbrugge a five-year probationary medical license
on the condition that Dr. Verbrugge would submit to a psychiatric evaluation and to
supervision by another physician. See Accused Doctor Gets Calif OK Drw. PosT, Nov.
1, 1995, at B5, available in 1995 WIL 10201248 [hereinafter Accused Doctor]. The
family of Richard Leonard, the young victim, brought a civil suit against Dr. Verbrugge, but the case settled for an undisclosed amount. See Sue Lindsay, Doctor Denies Mistreatmentof Patient,RocKy MTN. NEws, Apr. 27, 1996, at 17A, available in 1996
WL 7566848 [hereinafter Lindsay MV].
ISOSchrader, supra note 127, atAl. United States Representative Ron Wyden (DOr.), the main sponsor of HCQIA, adequately expressed the frustration many consumers feel when trying to obtain information regarding their physicians when he
stated: "Unfortunately, Americans today have more product performance information available to them when purchasing breakfast cereal then when choosing a
heart surgeon." Robin E. Margolis, Should Patients Have Access to National Physicians
MalpracticeRecords?, 10 HEALTHSPAN 24, 24 (1993); see also Adler, supra note 7, at 737
n.246 (noting that consumers cannot obtain information concerning their physi-
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limitation of the NPDB, consumer advocacy groups such as the Public Citizen Health Research Group (Public Citizens)13 ' and the National Center for Patient's Rights (NCPR)"5 have encouraged the
federal government to open the NPDB to the general public."" The
health care profession disapproves of opening the NPDBM because
of the fear that consumers will be misled by the information contained therein."
In sum, although they provide one mechanism to assure minimum professional competence, peer review actions do not adequately protect consumers from incompetent physicians.'M The selfregulating structure of peer review actions often fails to hold physicians accountable for incompetent care because physicians are uncomfortable disciplining their colleagues."' Finally, even when peer
review does result in disciplinary actions, consumers do not have access to this information and must continue to rely on onerous and
inadequate methods of acquiring information about their physicians. '"

cians but can currently obtain information from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration regarding the number of complaints lodged against their automobiles and from the Better Business Bureau regarding local businesses).
131 Public Citizens is a non-profit organization
for consumers. See Glazer, supra

note 86, at Z1O.
132

The NCPR is an advocacy group for patient's rights and malpractice
victims.

See id.
133 See Margolis, supra note 130, at 24 (reporting that representatives from
Public
Citizens and the NCPR testified at a hearing of the House of Representatives's
Small Business Committee's Regulation Subcommittee about the public's need for
easily accessible information regarding physicians).
See id. (noting that the AMA voted to abolish the NPDB).
13
See id. at 25 (reporting that United States Representative Larry Combest (RTex.), a prominent supporter of the HCQIA, noted that although medical malpractice settlements are required to be reported, the mere fact that a physician settled a
malpractice case does not necessarily signify that the physician was negligent). Further, Representative Combest also expressed concern that publicizing this information would hinder efforts aimed at promoting physician cooperation. See id.
13 See supra notes 95-99; see also Adler, supra note
7, at 696-700 (delineating preHCQIA deficiencies in the peer review process); Zeve, supra note 123, at 26-27
(outlining post-HCQIA deficiencies).
1$7 See Adler, supra
note 7, at 697.
138 See supra note 86 and accompanying
text (discussing the problems of obtaining information from state licensing boards). A medical board investigator recommended that ambitious and energetic consumers consult the civil index at their local courthouse because records of final judgments and pending lawsuits are public.
See Glazer, supra86, at Zl0.
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III. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AS AN ADDITIONAL MECHANISM TO
MONITOR COMPETENCE

A.

Introduction

Sanctions'"" provide society with a mechanism to encourage
quality health care. Health care professionals who fail to comply
with the appropriate standard of care can be excluded from the profession through sanctions.'" While the traditional civil sanctions,
which consist of lawsuits and disciplinary actions, aid in monitoring
incompetent physicians,1 41 their overall effectiveness in excluding incompetent physicians from the medical profession is lacking. 4 2 Traditional civil sanctions seek to correct and improve the performance
of physicians rather than exclude physicians from the profession.'
As such, severe deterrent sanctions may be necessary to protect consumers when the corrective civil sanctions fail to exclude incompetent physicians whose deficiencies result in fatal medical errors.144
The use of criminal sanctions to punish physicians for negligence is not a new phenomenon. 41 5 Although research has not rein Sanction is defined as a "[p]enalty or other mechanism of enforcement used
to provide incentives for obedience with the law or with rules and regulations."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990).
4 SeeJost, supra note 14, at 850.
See supra notes 39-45, 64-69, 90-94, 101-22 and accompanying text (discussing
how medical malpractice suits and professional disciplinary actions attempt to assure quality health care).
1
See supra notes 53-63, 70-89, 95-99, 123-38 and accompanying text (explaining
that medical malpractice suits and professional disciplinary actions inadequately
promote quality health care).
43 SeeJost, supra note 14, at 850 (noting that corrective sanctions can be effective
when the physician has the capacity to provide competent medical care, but merely
lacks proper guidance).
14 See id. (explaining that deterrent sanctions "may be appropriate for normative
deficiencies that result in technical or judgment errors or for careless production
processes"); see also Oberman, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that critics of peer review
and licensing boards argue that the disciplinary systems are "slow-moving," and resolving that "[s] ending a doctor to jail may be the only way to get him out of practice").
1
See, e.g., Donald C. Barrett, Homicide Predicated on Improper Treatment of Disease
or Injuty, 45 A.L.R. 3d 114, 123 (1972) (citing State v. Hardister, 38 Ark. 605, 60910, 613-14 (1882) (holding that an indictment charging obstetrician with malpractice, abandonment, and practicing without due caution was sufficient to sustain a
manslaughter charge); People v. Long, 103 P.2d 969, 977 (Cal. 1940) (holding that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain a manslaughter conviction against physician
who performed an abortion without due caution and circumspection); State v. Lester, 149 N.W. 297, 299 (Minn. 1914) (upholding manslaughter indictment of physician charged with negligently operating an x-ray machine that fatally wounded a
patient)).
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vealed any statistical evidence documenting the number of physicians subjected to criminal sanctions for the provision of incompetent care, anecdotal stories and newspaper headlines suggest that
this practice is on the rise."~ In the cases of Dr. Klvana,"7 Dr. Verbrugge,'" and Dr. Benjamin, 49 criminal sanctions were used when
the self-policing system failed to correct or exclude the incompetent
physicians from the medical profession. In other cases, however,
prosecutors have criminally charged physicians even when there was
no opportunity for the self-policing system to address, much less correct, the incompetent conduct."5
Determining where the line is drawn between criminal medical
errors, which warrant deterrent sanctions, and clinical medical errors, which warrant only corrective sanctions, requires examining the
actor's state of mind.'" While the legal issue concerns where this
line is drawn, this Note addresses the broader policy issue of whether
the use of criminal sanctions resolves the short-comings of the civil
sanctions currently used to monitor the quality of health care. The
following section focuses on the legal issue-that level of incompetence sufficient to justify pursuing criminal charges against a physician for a clinical error.
B.

CriminalLiability

Unlike civil liability, which is not concerned with the moral culpability of the wrongdoer, 52 criminal law is premised on the notion
that conviction for a crime requires a guilty mind, mens rea.' " As
See, e.g., Maier, supra note 4, at A35 (reporting that more and more prosecutors in the United States are indicting health care professionals for fatal medical
errors); Smith, supra note 4, at 131 (noting "a marked growth in the number of
prosecutions" against physicians whose negligence resulted in patients' deaths); see
also supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing medical community's concern
over the increased number of criminal prosecutions).
147 See supra note 88 (discussing the case of Dr. Klvana, who incompetently administered a labor-inducing drug).
148 See supra note 129 (detailing the case of Dr. Verbrugge, who fell asleep
during
an operation).
1
See infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (explaining the case of Dr. Benjamin who botched an abortion).
IO See infra notes 177-98 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Dr. Einaugler); infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Dr.
Swords).
146

SSee Smith, supra note 4, at 137.

An exception to this maxim is punitive damages. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing punitive damages).
See Smith, supra note 4, at 133, 137; see also Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability
and Retributive Theo7y: The Problem of CriminalNegligence, 5 J. CoNmTmp. LEGAL ISSUms
1
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discussed previously, negligent conduct is conduct that fails to meet

an objective standard of reasonable care,' " thereby creating an un-

justified risk that the conduct will result in harm.'55 Negligent medical conduct is conduct by a physician that does not comport with the
ordinary degree of knowledge and skill commonly possessed by physicians in the same field of practice.' The successful prosecution of

a physician for incompetence, however, requires a degree of negli-

gence beyond mere civil negligence.'57
The major distinction between risk-taking sufficient to create
criminal liability, as opposed to civil liability, is the level of indifference to the attendant risk of harm.'" If the degree of indifference to
the risk of harm amounts to either criminal negligence or reckless-

ness, prosecution of the physician may be appropriate.'59 Criminal

365, 375 (1994) (explaining that for negligent conduct "the actor's mental states
(including his beliefs and desires) are incidental or irrelevant").
15
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The concept of negligence
measures one's conduct against an objective standard of how a reasonable person
should act to avoid adverse consequences. See Smith, supra note 4, at 134-35.
in See DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 112 (explaining that "[a] person's conduct is
'negligent' if it constitutes a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would have observed in the actor's situation. Conduct constitutes such a deviation if the actor takes an unjustifiable risk of causing harm to another.").
15
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (outlining the standard of care
in medical malpractice actions); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 135 (arguing that,
although medical care that falls below acceptable standards may constitute negligence, such care may not support a finding of criminal culpability).
15,See DREsSLER, supra note 10, at 113 (explaining that "the level of negligence
should be so great 'that it would be shocking to allow the actor's lack of awareness
to excuse his actions in the circumstances'"); Smith, supra note 4, at 138-42
(explaining that the concept of gross negligence was developed to distinguish between those whose conduct was deserving of criminal punishment and those whose
conduct, while failing to meet the appropriate standard of care, did not deserve to
be punished in this manner). The concept of differing degrees of negligence, first
developed under Roman Law, was later adopted by English common law. See
PRossER rTAL., supra note 36, at 197. Three levels of negligence developed, including: "[(1) ] 'slight' negligence, defined as a failure to use great care; [ (2) ] ordinary
negligence, or failure to use reasonable care; and [(3)] 'gross' negligence, which is
failure to exercise even slight care." Id. Explained differently, the distinction between the concepts of "negligence, gross negligence and recklessness [is] the distinctions among a fool, a damned fool, and a God-damned fool." Id. at 198
(quotingJudge Magruder, HARVARD LAW RFCORD, Apr. 16, 1959).
15
See DRssLa, supra note 10, at 113. Whether an act is criminally or civilly negligent depends on the degree to which the actor's risk-taking is objectively unjustifiable--if the risk is substantial, the actor is criminally negligent. See id. In other
words, when the gravity of an injury and the probability that such an injury will occur drastically outweigh the burden to the actor in refraining from the risky conduct, criminal liability can be established. See id. at 112-13.
19
See, e.g., Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3, at B10 (discussing the cases of Dr.
Einaugler, Dr. Verbrugge, and Dr. Benjamin). Although often used interchangea-
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negligence is conduct that falls below the acceptable standard of care
and creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm.'6° The risktaking is objective because it is sufficient to find that, as a reasonable
person,1' the actor should have been aware of the risk.'6 2 In the context of medical conduct, when a physician's negligence rises to the
level of gross inattention, gross lack of competency, or criminal indifference to the patient's well-being, criminal negligence can be established.'" Where, however, the patient's death results from an inadvertent mistake or an error in judgment, and the physician did
bly, criminal negligence and recklessness are two different concepts of culpability;
recklessness is the more morally culpable version of criminal risk taking. See
DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 112, 115; Smith, supra note 4, at 140. The judicial system, however, as evidenced by courts' interchangeable treatment of criminal negligence and recklessness, appears not to be as concerned with the moral justification
for punishing negligence as is academia. See DREsSLER, supra note 10, at 113; Smith,
supra note 4, at 132.
164) e DREssLaR, supra note 10, at 113 (defining criminal negligence as
"conduct
that represents a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care, i.e., a person
is criminally negligent if he takes a substantialand unjustifiable risk of causing harm
that constitutes the offense charged"). English common law adopted the concept
of criminal negligence to distinguish negligent conduct that was criminally punishable from negligent conduct that, although it failed to meet an objective standard
of care, gave rise only to a claim for damages. See Smith, supra note 4, at 138; see also
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, REnNING CRIMiNAL LAw 262-63 (1978) (noting that the
American criminal law system has traditionally distinguished negligence sufficient
for civil liability from negligence sufficient for criminal liability by demanding
"gross negligence" in the criminal context); Simons, supra note 153, at 374 n.24
(explaining that "[tihe risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it... involves a gross deviation from the standard of care of a
reasonable person'") (citation omitted).
1
While criminal jurists have struggled to define the "reasonable person,"
a
leading tort treatise states that "'[the reasonable person] is not to be identified with
any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; [the reasonable person] is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to standard.'"
DREssLER, supra note 10, at 115 (citing DOBBS ET AL., supra note 37, § 32, at 175).
Although subject to increasing criticism, the current trend in the law is to incorporate "unusual physical characteristics (e.g., blindness)" into the reasonable person
standard when it is relevant to the case; however, "unusual mental characteristics"
are not incorporated. See id. (emphases added).
1
See id. at 112, 116; see also Simons, supra note 153, at 372 (explaining that
one
function of the negligence concept in criminal law is to specify objective criterion
for a reasonable person standard capable of application in many different contexts).
163 See FLETCHER, supra note 160, at 263; see also Gian-Cursio v. State,
180 So. 2d
396, 396-97, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (upholding conviction for manslaughter
of two chiropractic physicians who treated patients' tuberculosis without medication) (citing Hampton v. State, 39 So. 421, 423, 424 (Fla. 1905) (confirming a manslaughter conviction of a physician who inflicted mortal wounds to his patient's
womb, abdomen, and internal organs)). Criminal negligence may exist, for example, where a physician is grossly ignorant of the effects of remedies utilized, lacks
proper skill to perform a procedure or use an instrument, or fails to provide a patient with sufficient instructions concerning the use of medication. See id. at 399.
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nothing that a skilled physician in the same situation might not have
done, criminal liability should not attach.'
Recklessness, on the other hand, signifies a more culpable degree of risk-taking. 65 In contrast to criminal negligence in which the
actor is unaware of the substantial and unjustified risk, recklessness
involves a situation in which the actor is aware of the risk but makes
an affirmative decision to ignore the risk and continues acting in a
dangerous manner.'6 6 Therefore, unlike criminal negligence, recklessness is based on subjective fault where the actor is aware of a substantial and unjustified risk inherent in the conduct, but proceeds in
the face of such risk. 67 The actor is culpable precisely because she
places her own objectives above and beyond the safety of others.'"
At common law there were three levels of risk-taking for homicide:'6 9 (1) risk-taking that rose to the level of murder; (2) risk-taking
that rose to the level of manslaughter; and (3) risk-taking that rose
only to the level of civil liability.' ° Generally speaking, manslaughter
A See Gian-Cursio, 180 So. 2d at 399; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 146

(explaining that the criminal law should not apply to situations in which "a minor
assault resulted in freak damage").
165 See DRFSSLER, supra note 10, at 115.
166

See id. at 116.

167

See id. (explaining that "recklessness implicates subjective fault, in that the ac-

tor was aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk he was taking, and yet he consciously disregarded it and proceeded with his dangerous conduct"); Simons, supra
note 153, at 374 n.25 (stating that "'[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree
that... its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of care [of] a lawabiding person.'") (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985)). One criminal law scholar observed that a reasonable person standard shifts to "a law-abiding
person" standard when defining recklessness because the culpability for recklessness consists of conscious risk-taking that departs from a legally permissible level of
risk-taking. See FLETCHER, supra note 160, at 262. In direct contrast, culpability for
negligence consists of failing to meet a standard of attentiveness deemed reasonable. See id. Note, however, that the distinction between subjective fault and objective fault required to prove recklessness or criminal negligence, respectively, is relevant only to the extent that the two terms are differentiated. See DRESSLER, supra
note 10, at 115-16.
16 See Smith, supra note 4, at 137. Malice is a term that connotes
that an actor
committed a social harm with the intent to commit that harm. See DRESSLER, supra
note 10, at 116.
169 Homicide is defined as the "killing of a human being by a human
being."
DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 463 (citation omitted).
170See KAPLAN & WEISBFRG, supranote 5, at 195. The requisite level of risk-taking
sufficient to satisfy the different categories at common law was imprecise and unclear. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 478; see also KAPLAN & WEISBERG, supra note 5,
at 195 (quotation omitted). Common-law murder is defined as "'the killing of a
human being by another human being with malice aforethought.'" DRESSLER, supra
note 10, at 467. Common-law manslaughter is defined as "'an unlawful killing of a
human being by another human being without malice afterthought.'" Id. (opining
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involves a criminally negligent killing while murder requires an extremely reckless homicide."' In the context of medical errors, the
crimes charged against health care professionals are typically manslaughter' or negligent homicide."' When malice motivates the excessive risk-taking, the crime may be elevated to the level of murder.74 Additional charges have also been used by prosecutors,
that the term criminal negligence is the most appropriate modem term for manslaughter).
Many jurisdictions, following the common-law approach, include both recklessness and criminal negligence as the mens rea for the crime of involuntary manslaughter. See KAPLAN & WElSBERG, supra note 5, at 196-97; see also FLE'rER, supra
note 160, at 262 & n.7 (maintaining that the term involuntary manslaughter is
merely an antiquated way of referring to "unintentional homicide"). In those
states, it is inconsequential whether the actor consciously disregarded a substantial
and unjustified risk or acted inadvertently, so long as the conduct involved more
than the mere negligence sufficient for civil liability. See KAPLAN & WEISBERG, supra
note 5, at 196. Other jurisdictions, however, require a degree of recklessness for
involuntary manslaughter, making proof of gross negligence insufficient to support
a conviction. See id.at 197. In states that distinguish between recklessness and
criminal negligence, the latter suffices to prove negligent homicide. See FLETCHER,
supra note 160, at 264; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-4(a) (1994) (explaining that "[a]
person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death
of another person by criminal negligence"); id. § 13A-6-3(a) (pronouncing that "[a]
person commits the crime of manslaughter if: (1) He recklessly causes the death of
another person."); Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 13-1102(A) (1989) (noting that "[a] person
commits negligent homicide if with criminal negligence such person causes the
death of another person"); id.§ 13-1103(A) (noting that "[a] person commits manslaughter by: (1) recklessly causing the death of another person"); CoLO. Rrv.
STAT. § 18-3-105 (1990) (pointing out that "[any person who causes the death of
another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally
negligent homicide which is a class [five] felony"); id.§ 18-3-104(1) (stressing that
"[a] person commits the crime of manslaughter if: (a) Such person recklessly
causes the death of another person.").
SSee DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 478.
12 See Barrett, supra note 145, at 121. The Model
Penal Code codifies the common-law crimes of murder and manslaughter and also recognizes the crime of negligent homicide, which the common law did not recognize. See DRESSLER, supra note
10, at 500.
173 See Barrett, supra note 145, at 122. Negligent homicide, which
is codified in
the Model Penal Code at section 210.4, is the equivalent of involuntary manslaughter at common law. See DRSSLER, supra note 10, at 505. Liability for negligent killing expanded during the 1920s and 1930s with the advent of new offenses, including negligent homicide connected with driving a motor vehicle. See FLETCHER, supra
note 160, at 264.
14 See FLETcHER, supra note 160, at 264-65 (noting that one approach is to find
that the defendant was motivated by "'an abandoned or malignant heart,'" as required by California Penal Code section 188). One criminal law scholar notes,
however, that although these words appear in the statute, California courts typically
instruct juries to determine whether the defendant, "'for a base, anti-social motive
and with wanton disregard of human life'[,] did an act 'that involved a high degree
of probability that it would result in death.'" Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
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including the crimes of reckless endangerment"' and willful violation of a public health law. 176 In sum, the level of wrongful risktaking that a physician engages in will determine whether the physician should be charged criminally, and if so, the degree of criminal
liability. The following subsection provides examples of physicians
who have been criminally charged with either reckless endangerment, manslaughter, or murder for their patients' deaths.
C. Examples of CriminalProsecutions
1. Dr. Einaugler
In People v. Einaugler177 Dr. Gerald Einaugler, an attending physician at a nursing home,'78 was sentenced to fifty-two weekends' in
prison for reckless endangerment and willful violation of the state
health code for delaying the transfer of a nursing home resident to a

175 SePeople v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (App. Div.
1994) (Einaugler1)
(citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.20 (McKinney 1990) (explaining that "[a] person is
guilty of reckless endangerment... when he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person."), appeal denied, 627 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. 1995), habeas corpus denied in part and dismissed in part,
Einaugler v. Supreme Ct. of N.Y., 918 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Einauglerfl),
aff'd, 109 F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 1997) (EinauglerIfl). A federal district court, addressing
Dr. Einaugler's habeus petition, observed:
Reckless endangerment is the lowest of three levels of crimes prohibiting reckless conduct. The statutes defining it seek to prevent the risk
created by the actor's conduct, not a particular outcome. Thus unlike
reckless conduct which produces death (depraved mind murder;
manslaughter) or physical injury (assault), no injury results from reckless endangerment. The risk of injuiy alone sustainsprosecution.
EinauglerII,918 F. Supp. at 626-27 (quotation omitted).
6 Se EinauglerI, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (citing N.Y. PuBtuc HEALTH LAW
§ 12-b[2]
(McKinney 1990)). The Einauglercourt explained that the NewYork Public Health
Law "prohibits the commission of 'an act of... neglect.'" Id. Further, as the court
explained, the term neglect is defined as
failure to provide timely, consistent, safe, adequate and appropriate
services, treatment, and/or care to a patient or resident of a residential health care facility while such patient or resident is under the supervision of the facility, including but not limited to: nutrition, medication, therapies, sanitary clothing and surroundings, and activities of
daily living.
Id.
Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414.
17 See Einauglerl, 109 F.3d at 838.
17
According to one report, Dr. Einaugler arrived at the prison at 9:00 am.
on
Saturday morning and was released Sunday evening, repeating the process every
weekend for 52 weekends. See Larry McShane, DoctorJailed After Woman Dies in Medical Misstep, BuFF. NEWS, May 18, 1997, at A14, availablein 1997 WL 6436672.
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hospital." The medical mistake for which Dr. Einaugler was convicted began when Dr. Einaugler ordered a feeding solution to be
administered into the patient's abdomen catheter, which Dr. Einaugler thought was a gastrointestinal feeding tube, but was, in fact, a
peritoneal dialysis catheter.'8 ' Thus, a liquid feeding solution filled
the patient's peritoneal space instead of the special fluid that was
supposed to extract waste product from the patient's blood.'8 2 Several feedings were administered to the patient before a nurse detected the error and notified her supervisor who, in turn, notified
Dr. Einaugler." After learning about the error, Dr. Einaugler contacted Dr. Dunn, the Chief of Nephrology,'" at the hospital where
the catheter was inserted."" According to Dr. Dunn, he instructed
Dr. Einaugler to transfer the patient immediately. Dr. Einaugler
waited over ten hours from the time of his discussion with Dr. Dunn
before authorizing the transfer of the patient to the hospital where
she eventually died a few days later.'* Despite conflicting testimony
180

See id. Ms. Alida Lamour suffered from end-stage renal disease, which is a

disease that leads to permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis in order to perform
artificially the function of the kidneys. See Einaugler II, 918 F. Supp. at 621. Ms.
Lamour had been receiving hemodialysis treatment (a process by which products
from the blood are filtered through a machine) at Interfaith Hospital; however, her
weak cardiovascular system could no longer tolerate hemodialysis and she was
switched to peritoneal dialysis. See id. Peritoneal dialysis involves placing a thin
catheter permanently inside the cavity of the patient's abdomen, the peritoneal
space. See id. A special fluid is then administered through the catheter that fills the
peritoneal space and extracts waste products from the many blood vessels that line
the wall of the patient's abdomen. See id. After the hospital inserted the catheter
for the peritoneal dialysis, Ms. Lamour was transferred back to the nursing home.
See id.
181 SeeEinauglerII,918 F. Supp. at 621-22.
182 See id. at 621; see also supra note 180 (explaining the term "peritoneal dialysis"). Unfortunately, the nursing home was not capable of handling Ms. Lamour's
medical care because the medical staff was not familiar with the peritoneal dialysis
catheter and there was no protocol for the care of a patient with such a catheter. See
EinauglerH, 918 F. Supp. at 621. Dr. Einaugler testified that he read the patient's
transfer form that indicated that she had a Tenchkoff catheter, but because the
form said that the catheter was inserted for "intermittent peritoneal dialysis," he believed that the patient was receiving intermittent dialysis treatment, which requires
that a new catheter be inserted for every treatment. See id. at 622.
18s See EinauglerI, 918 F. Supp. at 622. By rolling the patient back and forth,
the
nurse was able to drain some of the feeding product from the catheter. See id.
18
A nephrologist is a kidney specialist. See People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d
414, 415 (App. Div. 1994) (Einaugler1).
185 See Einauger , 918 F. Supp. at 622.
18

See id. at 623.

See id. at 624-25. In summarizing the facts of the case, the district court
pointed out that there was evidence to suggest that critical medical treatment may
not have been administered to Ms. Lamour until the day after her arrival at the
1
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concerning the doctors' conversation,'" the jury ultimately determined that Dr. Einaugler was guilty of reckless endangerment and
willful violation of a public heath law.'"
A central issue in the Einaugler case was the concept of risktaking."* The appellate court concluded that the evidence supported the finding that Dr. Einaugler consciously appreciated, but
chose to disregard "a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the
hospital. See id. at 623. The district court admitted that, during the course of Ms.
Lamour's treatment, several acts of malpractice were committed by many actors. See
id. at 624. For example: (1) the patient was transferred to an institution that did
not have adequate training to care for her, (2) a feeding solution was inadvertently
fed into a dialysis catheter, (3) the error was not detected for over a day, (4) a decision was made to delay transferring the patient to a hospital, and (5) once at the
hospital, the necessary medical treatment might have been improperly delayed. See
id.
1
See id. at 622-23. Dr. Einaugler testified that he told Dr. Dunn on Sunday
morning that, although he had inadvertently ordered a feeding solution to be administered through the catheter, most of the solution had been drained and the
nurses assured him that the patient was stable. See id. at 622. According to Dr. Einaugler, Dr. Dunn told him, "'[D]on't get panicky. Don't worry, it doesn't seem like
any emergency the way you are describing it to me. If she's stable, send her to the
hospital Monday, and then we can evaluate her for dialysis and lavage.'" Id. Dr.
Einaugler testified that after the conversation he went to the nursing home to examine the patient and found her to be in stable condition. See id. Dr. Dunn, however, maintained that, upon learning about the situation from Dr. Einaugler, he
remarked, "'[W]ell let's get the patient into the hospital.'" Id. at 623. According to
Dr. Dunn, Dr. Einaugler assured him that the patient would be transferred. See id.
In addition, there was conflicting testimony concerning a conversation between Dr.
Einaugler and Dr. Khaski, the nursing home's supervising physician. See id. Although Dr. Khaski confirmed Dr. Einaugler's testimony regarding the conversation
with Dr. Dunn, Dr. Khaski testified that he advised Dr. Einaugler to transfer the patient immediately. See id. On this issue, Dr. Khaski's testimony was in direct contrast to that of Dr. Einaugler. See id.
189 See id. at 624, 626. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held
that the evidence produced at trial was legally sufficient to determine that Dr. Einaugler recklessly endangered the life of his patient and willfully violated a public
health statute. See EinaugLer I, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 415. Dr. Einaugler petitioned the
Eastern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that there was insufficient evidence to warrant his conviction on the two counts. SeeEinauglerll, 918
F. Supp. at 624. In addition, Dr. Einaugler argued that the prosecution's evidence,
which established that the cause of death was from chemical peritonitis, denied him
a fair trial because he was on trial for reckless endangerment, not homicide. See id.
The district court held that the evidence was sufficient to confirm the conviction,
and the admission of evidence regarding the cause of death did not prejudice Dr.
Einaugler because "[the essence of the charge alleged... was the substantial risk
of death created by [Dr. Einaugler's] delay in hospitalizing Ms. Lamour." Id. at 633.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. See People v. Einaugler, 109 F.3d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1997)
(EinauglerI).
190 See EinauglerII, 918 F. Supp. at 630 (stressing that "[t]he issue was the risk
to
[Ms. Lamour] created by petitioner's failure to hospitalize her for ten hours").
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patient."'
The court further added that Dr. Einaugler's actions
amounted to a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct" that a
reasonable person in a similar situation would have observed.'9
Moreover, because the conviction required more than a mere showing of negligence, the court flatly rejected Dr. Einaugler's argument
that affirming the conviction would result in the criminal prosecution of9 3 medical professionals for "honest errors in medical judgment."
In denying Dr. Einaugler's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a
federal district court stressed that Dr. Einaugler was not being held
criminally liable for the careless error of ordering the feeding solution.'" Such an error was the result of ignorance, which, the district
court explained, in and of itself is insufficient to prove the element
of criminal intent.'99 Dr. Einaugler's conscious deviation from the
appropriate standard of care provided the key element for a finding
of criminal liability.'96 Of import to this Note, the district court cautioned that the conviction did not signal a precedent for holding
physicians criminally liable for faulty medical judgments.1 9 According to the court, the case was not about Dr. Einaugler's exercise of
medical judgment; rather, it was about whether Dr. Einaugler chose
to ignore the judgment of a doctor whom he believed to be more
qualified, thereby subjecting the patient to a substantial and unjustifiable risk. '"
2. Dr. Swords
In another highly publicized case,19 9 Dr. Jack Swords was indicted on a manslaughter charge in connection with a patient's
9

Linaugler1, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
I9d.

9 Id. at 416.
SSee Einaugler I, 918 F. Supp. at 625. See supra note 189 for
a discussion of the
grounds for Dr. Einaugler's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
SSee Einauger , 918 F. Supp. at
625.
196
12

See id. at 625, 631.
See id. at 635.

See id. Dr. Einaugler began serving his sentence of 52 weekends in prison at
Rikers Island on May 17, 1997. See McShane, supra note 179, at A14. Dr. Einaugler
continues to insist that his error was not criminal: "'I have retried this case in my
mind so many times and still, I don't see where I did anything wrong .... I admitted from day one that I made a mistake with the (feeding) tube. But not after.
No.'" Id.
19
There is no reported court case for Dr. Swords because the prosecution
dropped the charges. See Oberman, supra note 17, at 2. As explained earlier, however, the term "case" in this Note encompasses situations in which physicians have
19
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death resulting from the doctor's failure properly to monitor the patient's diabetes." In December 1989, the patient was diagnosed as
hypoglycemic and taken off insulin at the hospital where he was being treated for pneumonia.2°' Thereafter, the diabetes was regulated
through diet and oral medication.2 Approximately one month after
returning to the nursing home,2' the patient was re-hositalized for
pneumonia and had a highly elevated blood sugar level.
Although
the hospital stabilized the diabetes, the patient never awoke from a
coma and died two weeks later.2°A physician for the state determined that the patient's diabetes
was improperly monitored at the nursing home resulting in the
coma that led to the patient's death.' Dr. Swords maintained, however, that he had a phone consultation regarding his patient's condition two days subsequent to the patient's return from the hospital."
In addition, Dr. Swords asserted that, five days later, he examined
the patient and found nothing unusual.2
Dr. Swords further
averred that he never knew of the patient's deteriorating condition
because he was not contacted by either the hospital or the nursing
home.2 Instead, Dr. Swords claimed, the nursing home notified the
on-call physician
of the patient's ailing condition two days after Dr.
2
Swords's visit. O

been criminally charged for medical errors that are reported by the press. See supra
note 26.
See Gianelli, supra note 4, at 1. The grand jury found that Dr. Swords "'did
unlawfully by act, procurement, or culpable negligence and without lawful justification, kill a human being, Homer Sherwood, by failing to provide necessary medical
care, and said killing was not an excusable homicide nor murder.'" Id. The indictment carried a possible prison term of up to 15 years. See id.
0
See id. at 2. The patient, Mr. Homer Sherwood, suffered from diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, and had survived several strokes. See id.
M

See id.

See id. (reporting that the diabetes continued to be controlled by oral medication at the nursing home).
See id. (noting that the patient's blood sugar level was 1420 when admitted to
the hospital).
05 See id.
See Gianelli, supra note 4, at 2. The coma resulted in hyperosmolarity and hyperglycemia, which proved to be toxic to the patient's brain, causing cerebral
edema and cerebral hypoxia. See id.
See id.
203

2Seid.
W9

eid.

See id. (noting that it was apparently the on-call physician who prescribed an
antibiotic and admitted the patient to the hospital where the patient subsequently
died).
210

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

612

[Vol. 28:569

Dr. Swords's attorneys contended that their client followed

proper procedures for monitoring the patient's diabetes and further
implied that, because there was no evidence that the doctor intended to harm the patient, there were no grounds for criminal liability.21' Furthermore, the attorneys claimed that it was absurd for
the state to single out Dr. Swords from all the other professionals
who treated the patient prior to his death.2 The doctor for the state
responded that he had no input in the political or legal decision to
prosecute Dr. Swords; rather, he was simply called as an expert witness to inform the jury about the appropriate standard of care for
treating a diabetic patient.213 The state alleged that Dr. Swords's
conduct fell below the standard of care because he failed to examine
the patient within forty-eight hours after the initial hospital discharge, in violation of a state requirement.2 14 Dr. Swords's case never

went to trial, however, because the charges against him were eventually dropped. 1 In both the cases of Dr. Einaugler and Dr. Swords,
research did not reveal any evidence of disciplinary actions against
216
the physicians prior to the incidents at issue.
3.

Dr. Benjamin

time New York
Dr. David Benjamin's case217 marked the first
21
?2 8
prosecutors charged a physician with the murder of a patient. 1
2
See id. One attorney for Dr. Swords commented, "'If alleged medical malpractice can be elevated to the criminal level without showing any intent to do harm on
the part of the physician, then doctors across America are in a sorry state of affairs.'"
Id. Another attorney for Dr. Swords remarked, "'I think physicians should be
frightened by this indictment, because it says a doctor can be accused of a felony, a
homicide, simply for treating a patient if the patient dies.'" Id. One of Dr. Swords'
attorneys suggested, however, that, although the evidence in Dr. Swords' case was
insufficient, criminal prosecution for the reckless conduct of physicians is under
used in situations where a physician's failure to address a mistake in medical judgment could demonstrate that the physician was indifferent to the patient's welfare.
See Oberman, supra note 17, at 2. As the attorney commented, "'[s] tupidity can elevate itself to reckless disregard.'" Id.
212 See Gianelli, supranote 4,
at 2.
213 See id. An investigator in the case commented, "'[P]hysicians are
not above
the law. If the physician does not give a patient prudent treatment shouldn't he be
subect to the law?'" Id.
See id.
21 See Oberman, supra note 17, at 2. No explanation was provided
for why the
charges were dropped. See id.
See People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414, 414-16 (App. Div. 1994) (Einaugler
1) (providing no mention of prior disciplinary actions); Gianelli, supra note 4, at 1-2
(same).
217 Research has not revealed a reported court case for Dr. Benjamin.
As explained earlier, however, the term "case" in this Note encompasses situations in
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The patient bled to death on a clinic operating table after Dr. Benjamin fatally tore her cervix during the performance of an abortion.2 Normally, a laceration of a patient's cervix does not constitute criminal conduct.22' In this case, however, the state prosecuted
Dr. Benjamin not for the medical error itself, but rather for deliberately neglecting the patient after the medical error.m Specifically,
the doctor was indicted for recklessly performing the operation and
then manifesting "depraved indifference to human life.""'
Dr. Benjamin had been previously disciplined five times for
bungled gynecological and obstetrical procedures.2 ' In fact, Dr.
Benjamin was practicing in Queens, New York, under an alias while
he was under investigation by the state medical board for his practice
in upstate New York.2m Unlike the cases of Dr. Einaugler and Dr.
Swords, this is a prime example of when criminal sanctions may be
necessary as an additional mechanism for monitoring physician
competence.

which physicians have been criminally charged for medical errors that are reported
by the press. See supranote 26.
18 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1987) (explaining that "[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree when.., under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person").
219 See Maier, supra note 4,
at A35.
2"
See Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3, at B10. According to authorities who
investigated the case, the doctor, utilizing a procedure designed for a fetus younger
than that of the patient, performed a second trimester abortion without determining why the patient suffered from high blood pressure. See New York Abortion Doctor
Indicted in Patient'sDeath, ORLANDO SENINEL, Aug. 13, 1993, at A10, available in 1993
WL 5240773.
See Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3, at B10.
See id. Following a conviction for second-degree murder, Dr. Benjamin was
sentenced to 25 years to life--the maximum penalty. See id.
2
Oberman, supra note 17, at 2. In addition, there were allegations that Dr.
Benjamin "misrepresented his knowledge of the gestation age of the fetus" and attempted to cover-up the cause of death by saying that the patient had suffered from
cardiac arrest. Bensel & Goldberg, supranote 3, at B10.
224 See Bensel & Goldberg, supra note 3, at B10.
5 See id. Dr. Benjamin's treatment
of Ms. Negron was first brought to the state
medical board's attention in October 1992. See Oberman, supra note 17, at 2.
Seven years earlier, however, the state board overturned a recommendation that Dr.
Benjamin's license be revoked. See id. (quoting a spokesperson for the New York
State Medical Board stating "'As far as we were concerned this physician should've
been out of practice in 1986 .... But the review process was moving forward as
quickly as it could .... Unfortunately, during the period designed to give him due
process, he continued to practice bad medicine.'").
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PROSECUTION OF HEALTH
CARE PROFESSIONALS

If the goal of quality assurance mechanisms is to protect consumers from incompetent physicians, then the use of criminal sanctions to exclude incompetent physicians from the medical profession
appears to be a legitimate quality assurance mechanism. In fact,
criminal sanctions may be the quality assurance mechanism necessary to compensate for the inefficiencies of traditional quality assurance mechanisms that rely on self-policing. As discussed previously,
self-policing systems have been ineffective in the past at monitoring
incompetent physicians because medical professionals are hesitant
to punish their colleagues.' Furthermore, given that state licensing
boards tend to be under-funded,"' the use of criminal sanctions may
become more frequent and necessary to exclude incompetent physicians from the medical profession. Consumer advocates encourage
the use of criminal sanctions as a welcome alternative to protect consumers precisely because the system of self-policing, through licensing boards or institutional peer review committees, is timeconsuming and has proven inadequate in many respects."'
Whether criminal sanctions or civil sanctions are desirable depends on the outcomes afforded by each sanction. Essentially, the
distinction between civil sanctions and criminal sanctions is based on
whether the defendant is required to compensate the individual victim for her loss or whether the defendant is required to pay society
for the loss.m Given that criminal sanctions hold defendants accountable to society in general, criminal sanctions, more than civil
sanctions, offer all consumers a mechanism of quality control.
Furthermore, if an additional role of criminal law, as some argue, is to educate the public about societal values and morals, criminal sanctions will encourage physicians to provide quality health
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (highlighting physicians' resistance to passjudgment on one another).
2V
See supranotes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the effects that a lack
of resources have upon quality assurance).
,, See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the deficiencies
of
formal peer review systems).
See State v. Weiner, 41 NJ. 21, 25, 194 A.2d 467, 469-70 (1963) (noting that
unlike a civil case, in which the issue is whether the victim or tortfeasor will bear the
financial cost of the loss, in a criminal case "[the injury to be vindicated is not the
personal wrong suffered by the victim but rather an outrage to the State"); see also
DOBBS ET AL, supra note 37, § 1, at 5-6 (explaining that the protection of societal
=6

interests is the goal of criminal law, whereas, the compensation for losses suffered
by the individual is the goal of tort law).
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care.2 " Failure to do so will result in the physician's exclusion not
only from the medical profession but also from society in general.'
This argument is based on a utilitarian notion that criminal sanctions are appropriate for negligent conduct because punishing negligent conduct encourages individuals to conduct themselves with
more caution. 23 2 The utilitarian theory supports using criminal sanctions as a mechanism of controlling the quality of health care, be-

230

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does 'Unlawful" Mean 'Criminal"?: Reflections on the

Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 193-94
(1991). AsJohn Coffee,Jr. explains:
The factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a
system of moral education and socialization. The criminal law is
obeyed not simply because there is a legal threat underlying it, but because the public perceives its norms to be legitimate and deserving of
compliance. Far more than tort law, the criminal law is a system for
public communication of values.
Id. (citation omitted).
2
See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 17-93-409(1) (Michie 1992); IOWA CODE §
147.55(5) (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:17(VI)(c), (VI)(j) (1995); see also
supra, note 88 (discussing the case of Dr. Klvana, who was sentenced to 53 years in
prison); supra notes 177-98 (discussing the case of Dr. Einaugler, who was sentenced to 52 weekends in prison); supra notes 217-25 (discussing the case of Dr.
Benamin, who was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life).
See DREsSLER, supra note 10, at 114. Although it is highly controversial to punish negligent conduct without proof of subjective fault, one justification for this
practice is grounded in utilitarian principles. See id. at 113-14 (noting Oliver Wendell Holmes's blunt observation that "'public policy sacrifices the individual to the
general good'"). Based on utilitarian principles, the justification for punishing negligent conduct is that society in general will benefit because individuals will be coerced to act more cautiously. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 132 (citing
H.L.A. Hart, Negligence Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND
RF_sPoNsiaInYu
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (1968) (professing that negligent conduct should be held criminally culpable to encourage individuals to act
more carefully); GtivILtE WILLIAMS, TEXTM)O OF CRiMINAL LAw 91 (1983)
(endorsing punishment for negligent conduct on the ground that the individual
may act better after being punished)).
For example, an ex-Navy surgeon who served two years in prison for the death
of three patients (although later exonerated by an appeals committee) returned to
the practice of medicine after his prison term but no longer practiced surgery. See
Arnold Q. Collins, Findinga Safe Harbor: Ex-Navy Physician Cleared in Deaths, in Civilian Practice,AM. MED. NEws,June 10, 1991, at 2, availablein 1991 WL 4845714. The
surgeon explained that he is more cautious in his practice as a result of being
charged criminally for his connection in a patient's death:
I see kids, but I won't see very sick ones .... I'll do office gynecology,
but I won't operate. And I'll do orthopedic work - - but nothing big.
In this office, we're not going to treat anyone if we're likely to have a
dead patient or if we're likely to be sued .... And we're not on the
frontiers of medicine .... There's nothing experimental, so you can
feel very safe.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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cause the threat of criminal sanctions would encourage, if not force,
physicians to monitor their own practices. 3
Another argument that justifies punishing physicians for negligent care, the retributive theory, posits that the term "criminal negligence" implies that the actor's risk-taking was grossly unjustified and
therefore deserves punishment"5 As one commentator reasoned,
inadvertent risk-taking is "a fault in social interaction" that should be
punished through criminal sanctions."" According to proponents of
this argument, the actor's inattentiveness is culpable because the actor is not taking into consideration the impact her behavior has on
the lives of others."5 Based on this notion, the case of Dr. Einaugler2 7 was correctly decided if the jury found that Dr. Einaugler
knew the risk created by delaying the patient's transfer, but determined that he took the risk for no justifiable reason.
Retributive theorists who oppose criminally punishing negligent
conduct argue that a just criminal system should only punish those
who have voluntarily committed a wrong" A retributive theory of
criminal liability approves of punishing an actor who intentionally
causes harm to another or who is aware that the conduct at issue creates an unjustified risk of harming others but proceeds anyway. It is
unjust, based on this theory, to punish an actor for negligent conduct where the risk-taking is inadvertent and the actor is unaware
that the conduct creates a risk of danger.3
In addition, critics of punishing negligent conduct question the
deterrent value on which the above utilitarian argument is prem233

See DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 114.

234

Seeid.

2"

FLERCER, supra note 160, at 264.

Seeid.
See supra notes 177-98 and accompanying text (detailing Dr. Einaugler's
prosecution).
23 See DRssLR, supranote 10, at 114. One commentator explains:
The punitive urge to punish those who have caused harm, without any
sophisticated moral assessment of the actor's state of mind, is always
present in society and can easily turn the criminal law into an instrument of oppression. The medical profession is particularly vulnerable
to this, as it may be perceived as exploitative or unaccountable,
prompting the public to derive some pleasure form seeing members
of the profession in the dock.
Smith, supranote 4, at 145.
239 See DRESsLER, supra note 10, at 114 (citing Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior
25

237

Should Be Excluded From PenalLiability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 641 (1963)).

But see

Simons, supra note 153, at 397 (arguing that culpable indifference, where an actor
"shows a grossly inadequate concern for a risk of harm" is an adequate threshold of
culpability for criminal liability).
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ised. 240 Specifically, critics argue that imposing criminal sanctions on
a negligent actor is ineffective because a negligent actor, who by
definition fails to recognize her dangerous conduct, would also fail
to comprehend the potential threat of sanctions for such conduct.24'
Furthermore, it is argued that although negligent actors should pay
for the injuries they cause, by compensating the injured party, those
who act negligently do not deserve to lose their liberty and be stigmatized.2 2
Medical associations and physician groups argue that holding
physicians criminally liable for clinical errors, without a clear finding
of a subjective intent to harm a patient, sets a dangerous precedent. 4 Rather than encouraging physicians to practice more safely,
some critics argue that such a precedent will drive physicians away
from taking hard cases or experimenting in new areas. 2" Others argue that the threat of criminal sanctions will result in the practice of
defensive medicine, which will increase health care costs and may
even harm patients. 24 , In addition, the medical profession is con,40 See Hall, supranote 239, at 641.
241 See id.
342 SeeDRFSsLER, supra note 10, at 114; see also Gianelli, supra
note 4, at 2 (quoting
an attorney defending a physician against criminal charges: "If alleged malpractice
can be elevated to the criminal level without showing any intent to do harm on the
part of the physician, then doctors across America are in a sorry state of affairs");
Maier, supra note 4, at A35 (quoting a spokesperson for a medical society as stating:
"This [prosecuting doctors for deadly medical errors] is a dangerous precedent to
set because human beings can make errors"); Howard Pankratz, Vigilance Failure
Charged Anesthesiologist on Trial in Death of Boy During Surgery, DENY. PosT, Oct. 3,
1996, at Bi, available in 1996 WL 12632961 (reporting that a defense attorney admitted that the doctor may have committed malpractice, but argued that he did not
make the challenged medical decision with criminal intent); Police Seek, supra note
2, at C6 (quoting an attorney representing a nurse in a case where the accidental
administration of the wrong drug resulted in the patient's death: "We should worry
about people who intentionally go out and violate the law .... Ijust think it would
be a mistake to involve the criminal system."). In the case of the former Navy surgeon, see supra note 232 and accompanying text, it was reported that an appeals
court, which overturned the surgeon's manslaughter and negligent homicide convictions, accused prosecutors of mounting a "'smear campaign' and attempt[ing] to
impute criminal liability." Collins, supra note 232, at 2.
See Maier, supra note 4, at A35 (quoting a New York State Medical Society
spokesperson as stating: "The specter of criminality may make doctors shy away
from more difficult cases. No professional is prepared to go to jail for making an
error in clinical judgment."); see also supra note 4 (discussing the profession's concern over increased prosecutions).
2 See Lindsay IV, supra note 129, at 17A (quoting the AMA's warning that charging doctors criminally for medical errors would be "'a disaster for patients'").
See, e.g., Gianelli, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the Florida Medical Association's general counsel warned that if the state is "looking over [doctors'] shoulders"
every time the treatment of a patient results in death, doctors will be wary of treat-
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cerned that attorneys and lay juries will usurp the role of medical experts in defining the appropriate standard of care.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the prosecution of health care professionals presents
an effective additional mechanism to assure quality health care. The
current mechanisms of civil sanctions and disciplinary actions are insufficient to punish adequately health care professionals who intentionally harm patients or consciously disregard a substantial and uning patients); Lindsay IV, supra note 129, at 17A (reporting that the chairwoman of
the AMA warned that doctors will grow fearful of making medical decisions if they
are prosecuted for medical errors); Smith, supra note 4, at 144 (explaining that
medical professionals have argued that because errors in medicine are inevitable
due to the complex nature of the activity, labeling these errors as criminal will result in the practice of defensive medicine). It is estimated that the practice of defensive medicine costs from $20 to $25 billion annually. See, e.g.,Jost, supra note 55,
at 74; Lozano, supra note 46, at 40. But see HARNEY, supra note 22, at 417 (observing
that although health care professionals and insurance companies argue that the
practice of defensive medicine is very costly to the public, in the author's 35 years of
experience handling medical malpractice cases he never came across a case in
which a health care professional actually practiced defensive medicine); Jost, supra
note 5, at 574 n.286 (noting that some commentators argue that the extent of the
practice of defensive medicine is exaggerated as there is little data to support the
claim). For a more detailed discussion on the role of civil liability and the practice
of defensive medicine see Robinson, supra note 50, at 175-80.
246 See Oberman, supra note 17, at 2. The district court in Einaugler
was troubled
by the fact that lay juries in a criminal case may be responsible for determining the
appropriate standard of medical care without the assistance of medical experts. See
People v. Einaugler, 918 F. Supp. 619, 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Einauglerfl), affid, 109
F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 1997) (EinauglerIll). In pertinent part, the court stated:
What makes this a troubling case is that none of the witnesses called
by the prosecution testified directly that the delay [in transferring the
patient from the nursing home to the hospital] created even a risk of
death, much less a quantifiable risk of death, and that a lay jury in a
criminal case was forced to deduce this critical element of the offense
from circumstantial evidence. Even in civil medical malpractice cases,
New York law recognizes that the intricacies of medical practice are
beyond the competence of the ordinary lay person and that without
expert assistance, jurors cannot reliably evaluate the contentions of
the parties. Such testimony is especially important on the difficult issue of causation.
Id. Nevertheless, after reviewing several physicians' testimony, none of whom specifically addressed the issue of causation, the court held that "although this is a
close call.., there was sufficiently comprehensive evidence for the jury to make a
rational assessment of the relevant risk." Id. at 631. The appellate court also recognized that expert testimony on the risk of death caused by the delay would have
strengthened the state's case against Dr. Einaugler, but determined that medical
expert testimony was not necessary in this particular case because the testimony of a
medical expert has never been required under New York criminal law in a reckless
endangerment case. SeeEinauglerII, 109 F.3d at 841-42.

1997]

PROSECUTIONOFINCOMPETENTPHYSICIANS

619

justifiable risk. The criminal law should not, however, operate in isolation from these current mechanisms. Unlike in other areas of law,
the customs of this profession define the standard of care to which
physicians are held; therefore courts require a medical professional's
expertise.2

7

Rather than merely coexisting, the civil and criminal sys-

tems should operate cooperatively so that civil sanctions afford physicians an opportunity to correct their incompetence, while at the
same time, consumers are protected when the corrective civil system
fails.2 48 For example, in such a system prosecutors could seek the aid

of medical experts, perhaps those medical experts who sit on state
licensing boards, before charging a physician with a crime. In this
way, a physician's incompetence would be brought to the attention
of medical experts who could then determine whether the clinical
error constitutes civil negligence requiring only civil sanctions or
whether the clinical error rises to the level of criminal negligence,
thereby justifying the criminal prosecution of the physician. 49 In
sum, the current mechanisms of professional regulation are wholly
inadequate at monitoring physicians. As such, the additional threat
of criminal sanctions for fatal clinical errors would serve to deter
physicians from the provision of incompetent medical care and
thereby further assure quality health care to consumers.
Kara M McCarthy

247 See supra notes 41-42, 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing
the standard
of care applied in medical malpractice suits).
24 See, e.g., Oberman, supra note
17, at 2.

249 See id. (reporting that a physician, the former president of a medical society,
suggested that expert medical panels should be convened before criminal charges

are instituted against a physician "to better distinguish criminal conduct from understandable mistakes").

